Many wonder why the laws of Tzara’as on the house appear in a totally separate parasha from the rest of Hilchos Nega’im. Obviously, there is something that makes Nega’ei Batim very different from any other form of Tzara’as. However, the Midrash Tanchuma explains that when Klal Yisrael would sin, Hashem would restrain Himself from immediately expelling them from Eretz Yisrael, opting to first send a call for Teshuva. He would inflict their houses with Negai’m. If they would do Teshuva, good; but if not, He would inflict their clothing. Then He would send Karachas and Gabachas, then Nesakim, then Shchin, and finally Se’ais Sopachas and Baheres. If none of these would convince Klal Yisrael to do Teshuva, He would then kick them out. It seems clear from the Midrash that there is a very close correlation between Niga’ei Batim and other Nega’im, so what reason do we have to consider the house’s Tzara’as so different?
Here’s one difference: Regarding the process of declaring Nega’ei Batim, the pasuk says “U’Va Asher Lo HaBayis ViHigid LaKohein, KiNega Nirah Li BaBayis.” Until now, by the Tzara’as of the body and clothing, the person would bring the Nega to the Kohein without a declaration; he never had to say anything. But all of a sudden, the Torah gets very particular about the exact phrasing this man should use when addressing the Kohein.
More to the point, the pasuk insists that the man not pronounce the spot on his walls an actual Nega; rather, he should say it looks like a Nega and leave it to the Kohein to decide for sure, no matter how certain he is. Rashi comments, even if the man is a Talmid Chacham and he knows for sure, he shouldn’t paskin with words of certainty. The Mifarshim are very bothered by this comment. We all know that Nega’im are only Tamei once the Kohein pronounces them Tamei, and even the greatest Talmid Chacham hasn’t the ability to execute psak on his own. Why then should the Torah care at all what the Talmid Cacham, or any other individual for that matter, says about the Nega?! The Mizrachi explains that Rashi didn’t intend us to think the Chacham could paskin the case on his own; rather, Rashi meant that it’s not proper Derech Eretz for the Chacham to talk with such certainty; it would be arrogant of him to declare a ruling if he is not in position to execute that ruling himself.
However, there is a severe problem with our understanding of the Mizrachi’s explanation. Rashi seems so concerned for the words that the homeowner uses regarding the Nega, yet the Kohein himself, before he even goes to visit the house, tells the homeowner to clean out all of his possessions so they do not become Tamei. Shouldn’t the Kohein first take a look at the house, and then tell the man to clean it out immediately before declaring “Tamei Hu?” Yet he instead says right away, “go clean out your house, I’m sure it’s a Nega.” What happened to stressing “KiNega Nirah Li BaBayis?!”
There seems to be a much more significant difference in the way the Torah goes about describing Nega’ei Batim: Until now, the Torah spent a great deal of time discussing the process behind declaring Nega’im to be Tamei. What if it’s not deep enough, what if it has two hairs, what if it it’s not bright enough, et cetera. When it comes to Nega’ei Batim, however, there is only one pasuk that deals with symptoms, and that pasuk is out of order! The pasuk describes the walls’ symptoms as “Skika’aruruot Yirakrakot O’ Adamdamot U’Mareihen Shafal Min HaKir.” Rashi explains Skika’arurot to mean “sunken,” prompting the Malbim to ask why the pasuk has to repeat this idea of sunkenness when it says “U’Mareihen Shafal Min HaKir.” The Malbim answers that the first term refers to a physical sunkenness into the thickness of the wall while the second is a visual lowness, like the appearance of sunlight against shade. One would then expect to the Kohein to check for physical sunkenness by peeling away at the wall and seeing what is underneath, but the Kohein would never bother checking for Shikuah first. What if the surfaces’ color is not Shafal? The pasuk must be out of order; amazingly, it avoids the description of process. It treats the symptoms of the Nega as a given, not a possibility. Why then do we stress the need to say “KiNega” by the house’s Tzara’as; it seems like the least plausible place for the patient to stress his uncertainty and humility!
But we are still avoiding the most apparent contrast: When the Kohein is confronted with any form of Tzara’as in Parashat Sazria, he first quarantines the object until he decides it is Tamei, and then he either destroys it or exiles him. Immediately. When the Kohein is confronted with Nega’ei Batim, however, the house is declared Tamei the moment it is quarantined. The next two to three weeks are to see whether the Tumah will disappear. The Tamei house is never destroyed immediately or even after one week, no matter how severe the affliction is. In short, we could propose that the Kohein’s role in Parashat Sazria is to search for Tumah while the Kohein’s role in Metzorah is to search for Tahara. This explains why Nega’ei Batim is paired with Tahara process of a Metzorah instead of with Nega’ei Begadim or Baheres.
Which leads us to the most startling contrast between Nega’ei Batim and all other forms: The pasuk says “ViYatza HaKohein Min HaBayis El Pesach HaBayis, ViHisgir Es HaBayis Shivas Yamim,” the Kohein first leaves the house and then declares it Tamei. The reason for this is relatively obvious. If the Kohein declares it Tamei while he’s standing inside, he would become Tamei as well; it makes sense for the Kohein to just stand outside and avoid the Tumah. We see that the general case of Tzara’as HaBayis is that the Nega grows on the inside of the house, not the façade. This point is restated in pasuk 41, which commands the house to be patched “MiBayis Saviv,” all around on the inside. Therefore, when the Kohein comes back seven days later to inspect the Nega, he has no choice but to enter the house and become Tamei (or at least risk becoming Tamei, for he must remain inside Kidei Achilas Pras to become Tamei. Unlikely though that he could scrape away the plaster and sufficiently check both the Nega’s surface and underneath in such a short time span). By other forms of Tzara’as, the Kohein never seems to risk Tumah. Even when the Kohein becomes Tamei by Parah Adumah, it serves a productive purpose. Here, there’s always the potential that the Kohein will become Tamei for no reason; he will visit to try and be Mitaheir the house only to discover the futility of his visit.
Perhaps this is why the Mishna in Nega’im (13:1) says a house that is cured from Tzara’as in one week requires no Korban, but a house whose Nega remains for one week, then is quarantined for a second week, and then disappears, does require a Korban. If the Kohein returns to a Tahor house after one week, his visit is not only beneficial, but he doesn’t become Tamei upon entry into the house. But if the Nega lasts two weeks, the Kohein does become Tamei when he enters to inspect after the first week, and to atone for causing this Kohein to needlessly be Mitamei himself, the homeowner must bring a Korban.
Nega’ei Batim really forces us consider the relationship between the Kohein and his patient. The Kohein doesn’t just show up and declare the house Tahor or Tamei, he doesn’t just determine whether his patient has done sufficient Teshuva. Instead, he inspires and motivates his patient to come clean, he expresses his confidence that the homeowner has done Teshuva and there will be no negative consequences to his entry into the house and inspection of the Nega. In effect, the patient feels he owes it to the Kohein to do Teshuva. If someone could have so much faith in him, the least he could do is try and repent. And if the Kohein ever emerges as a Rishon LiTumah with bad news, it deeply disappoints the patient; and if he ever does eventually do Teshuva, he brings a Korban to express how truly sorry he is for taking a week or two too long to fix his ways.
Of course the Kohein has to eventually give up on this individual. Rashi notes that even if the Nega doesn’t spread either of the first two weeks, the Kohein still orders the wall to be breached and patched. At this point, the Kohein does everything in his power to avoid a Chazaka of futile attempts at curing both the house and its owner; he therefore takes forceful action and gets rid of the Nega himself. And if it returns the next week, the Kohein’s endeavor is considered totally futile, the house is demolished, and the Kohein stops risking his state of Tahara for this man’s sake. The next time the patient gets Tzara’as, it will be on his clothing. The Kohein will say, “I’m no longer here to inspire you to do Teshuva; I’m only here to declare that you still haven’t atoned and then burn your possessions. I tried my best to help, but now it’s up to you to repent.”
By now, it should be obvious why the pasuk so forcefully discourages the patient from calling the spot on his house a Nega; the relationship this man is supposed to build with the Kohein is one where he bears concern for the Kohein’s Tahara, he hopes to never place the Kohein in a position susceptible to the contraction of Tumah. Even if the man is a Talmid Chacham, it would be the greatest Chutzpa in the world to call over a Kohein and insist that he enter to inspect a Nega! Instead, the person must humbly implore, “I hope this doesn’t inconvenience you, but I might have something that’s like a Nega on my house’s walls. I’m sure it’s nothing, but could you take a look at it for me?” The Kohein, too, plays his part right off the Torah’s script. He replies, “I don’t mind at all if it’s a Nega because I’m so certain you’ll do Teshuva if it is. In fact, I’m so excited to help you through this difficult time that I want you to clean your house out before I even arrive, just to prove to you how little I mind the potential inconvenience.” And thus is the patient inspired through positive reinforcement and positive attitude.
Ultimately, we come to recognize through this most peculiar dialogue the incredible relationship established between the Kohein and his patient. Like the pasuk says, “LiHoros BiYom HaTamei U’BiYom HaTahor, Zos Toras HaTzara’as.” These laws of Tzara’as are not the Kohein’s to merely declare; they are his tools to teach by example, and if the Kohein succeeds at inspecting houses, then he succeeds at keeping Bnei Yisrael out of Galus.
Good Shabbos.
15.4.05
8.4.05
Parashat Sazria
There are few parashiot as terrifying as Tazria and Metzorah. The pasukim demand that we picture ourselves in an ancient time, when Hashem’s presence could be felt, and even the most physical elements of this world – skin clothes and houses – could indicate one’s spiritual standing. The parasha seems to take place in an environment totally removed from our physical world. Judgment is not measured with oxen or fields, nor is justice served with a whip or sword. Even our standard parasha about Tumah and Tahara will center about carcasses or dead bodies, but we have no way to relate to the Nega. Whether Baheres or Se’ais, or a Sopachas of Baheres or a Sopachas of Se’ais (see Mishnayos Nega’im, 1:1), modern times has left us no sufficient model of the Biblical disease. What can we possibly glean from these pasukim – this parasha and a half of seemingly the same details over and over – in a time when we can’t even sufficiently imagine the subject matter?
Perhaps what makes Parashat Nega’im so challenging isn’t even the overwhelming deluge of antiquated law, for we could still associate the physical blemish with spiritual impropriety, instead of with ritual impurity. But to view the Nega as the physical embodiment of Tumah, like one views a carcass, one would never expect to find a law that a man covered head to toe with Tzara’as is pure (13:13)! Clearly the person and not the Nega is what’s impure (see 13:3 Rashi D”H ViTimei Oso), not that this helps us understand the Torah’s ruling here; it still seems to be the epitomic Gezeiras HaKasuv, the law that defies all logic and reasoning.
Though the logic of this law, the head-to-toe Tzara’as, seems hopelessly broken, we should not neglect to note that the pasuk’s placement is equally baffling. The description of regular Nega’im developing on healthy skin spans two separate pesuchos in our parasha. The first deals with the symptom of Pisyon, spreading, while the second relates the laws of the symptom Michyah, healthy flesh in the center of the Nega. Here’s some quick background: in order for the Nega to be Tamei, it has to be white and either 1) turn two hairs white, 2) spread after first being examined by the Kohein, or 3) have a Michyah. One would expect to find the law of head-to-toe Tzara’as in the section about Pisyon, yet it appears within the context of the Michyah. Very strange.
This leads us to wonder why, of all the parashiot in Tazria, healthy skin should be given two separate pesuchot altogether. Burns and boils share one, and Nesek Bohak Karachas and Gabachas share one with all of Tzara’as Begadim (each type listed above at least gets its own stumah, except Karachas and Gabachas). Surely there must be something truly unique about each paragraph, some reason why the rest of the parasha categorizes by blemish but these two paragraphs categorize by symptom, but what? Let’s first analyze how these two paragraphs are different, and once we recognize their differences, perhaps we will be able to identify the unique nature of each symptom’s tale. Maybe then we’ll understand a little more about this head-to-toe Tzara’as and what reasoning may warrant its baffling laws.
1) Starting from the beginning, each paragraph opens with the development of a Nega, but in the first paragraph, henceforth called Pisyon, we read “Adam Ki Yiheeyeh ViOr Bissaro… ViHaya ViOr Bissaro LiNega Tzara’as,” while the second paragraph, Michyah, reads “Nega Tzara’as Ki Siheeyeh BiAdam.”
2) In Pisyon, the Nega is then “Huva El Aharon HaKohein O’ El Achad MiBanav HaKohanim,” but in Michyah, it is only “Huva El HaKohein.”
3) In Pisyon, we entertain the possibility that the Nega does or doesn’t have hair in it (pasukim 3 and 4, respectively). But in Michyah, we only mention the case where the Nega has hair and is Tamei, not the scenario where it doesn’t have hair and is Tahor.
4) In Pisyon, we regard the Nega as Baheres (13:4), the brightest of all four shades of white (again, see Mishnayos Negayim 1:1). But in Michyah, the Nega is exclusively called Se’ais (13:10), the weakest shade, though Rashi comments that a Michyah could halachically affect any shade of white, even Baheres.
5) Each paragraph refers to “Nega Tzara’as” in at least one place (13:2, 3, and 9). Rashi notes in pasuk 9 that the term Negah is lashon zachar (this is clear from pasukim 5, 6,and 17) while Tzara’as is lashon nikeivah (see pasukim 12 and 13). But in pasuk 3, the term Negah Tzara’as is lashon zachar (Hu), while in pasuk 9, the term is nikeivah (Ki Siheeyeh).
While we’re on the topic of lashon zachar and nikeivah, let’s analyze a few more pasukim and try to figure out what lashonos the rest of our parasha’s terms are. Adam, it goes without saying, is zachar. Se’ais and Baheres are both lashon nikeivah; Se’ais is proven from pasuk 10, Baheres is clear from pasuk 4. Sopachas seems the same as Mispachas, which is clearly nikeivah based on pasuk 7, and the gemara in Shavuos 6b indeed writes about it in lashon nikeivah. Additionally, Basar is zachar (see pasuk 15), as is Sei’ar (see pasuk 3). Now that we have all these rules straight, the flip-flopping uses of lashonos zachar and nikeivah behind each and every pasuk can be understood.
Well, every pasuk but the first one, which says “Adam Ki Yiheeyeh ViOr Bissaro Se’ais O’ Sopachas…” What does Yiheeyeh refer to? It can’t belong to “ViOr Bissaro” otherwise the pasuk would leave out the Bais prefix. Technically, one could try to apply it to the term Adam, the only other lashon zachar term in the pasuk, but that would sound weird; the same would be true for the continuation of the pasuk, which reads, “ViHaya ViOr Vissaro LiNega Tzara’as.” What sense then can we make of this pasuk’s structure?
Looking back, pasuk 2 is the introduction to Pisyon, and it seems to directly contrast the phrase “Nega Tzara’as Ki Siheeyeh BiAdam” in pasuk 9, the introduction to Michyah. Pasuk 9 seems to describe a spot of Tzara’as, thus explaining why the pasuk describes it in lashon nikeivah, though a Kohein has not yet inspected it. In Pisyon, however, the pasuk says Nega Tzara’as Hu, the Nega is Tzara’as, only after the Kohein inspects it. So Michyah is highlighted by our certainty that the spot is Tzara’as. In contrast, Pisyon seems to be highlighted by our skepticism.
In essence, there are two types of people who are brought to the Kohein to get checked for Nega’im: the paranoid person who is always certain that every little mark on his body is a Nega, and the smug person who lives in denial of his problems. The smug person is dragged to the Kohein by his caring friends, hence that lashon of ViHuva, he is brought. Keep in mind that only a Kohein may pronounce Tzara’as Tamei or Tahor. Even if he doesn’t know the Dinim, a non-Kohein expert can instruct him regarding what to declare, so technically even non-Kohanim could check Nega’im if they know what to look for. Quite possibly, some of the best Nega inspectors were not even Kohanim. The paranoid person isn’t looking for Mussar from the Kohein (the Sifra talks about how before the Kohein would even check the Nega, he would first reprimand the patient for even thinking that he could have Tzara’as, such thoughts suggest that a person suspects himself guilty of terrible sins like Lashon Hara or Geiva, and a guilty conscience can be very telling sometimes); rather, he’s looking for the most accurate psak. He too is dragged to the Kohein, but by the non-Kohein expert, not his friends.
The paragraph about Pisyon details the story of the paranoid patient, a man dragged “LiAharon HaKohein O’ El Achad MiBanav HaKohanim,” which happens to be the phrase from which we learn out the law that only a Kohein and not an expert can pronounce Tumah and Tahara (see Sifsei Chachamim). The prospect of Tumas Tzara’as is made up in his mind – either through total fabrication or due to guilty conscience – hence the lashon zachar “Ki Yiheeyeh” and “ViHaya,” when the man thinks he has Tzara’as and brings it to the expert, he shall be brought [by the expert] to Aharon or one of his sons. We suspect the man is needlessly paranoid, but can’t rule out the chance that he may have Tzara’as until after inspecting him; therefore, the pasuk writes upon discovery, “Nega Tzara’as Hu.” In contrast, the paragraph of Michyah relates the story of a man in denial; everyone sees Nega’im spreading all over his body, so they drag him directly to the Kohein for his own good so he can begin his spiritual rehabilitation, hence the simple lashon ViHuva El HaKohein. Because of the certainty of his ailment, the pasukim don’t bother entertaining the chance that his Nega is not bright enough or that it doesn’t turn hairs white.
We can now return to our original conjecture that the spiritual ailment a person suffers could be reflected through his physical condition. Pisyon is the perfect physical embodiment of paranoia! The Nega spreads and spreads until it seizes practically his entire body. The Michya, the healthy skin, is the perfect physical embodiment of denial! In fact, the pasuk says “Tzara’as Noshenes Hee,” the Michyah is actually healthy skin with Tzara’as underneath, in hiding. Because the Tzra’as is healing from the inside out, we determine that it’s not really healing at all, and the Michyah, the physical reflection of the patient’s denial, becomes the incriminating sign. When the Kohein pronounces him Tamei, the pasuk adds two extra words. “Lo Yasgirenu,” do not keep him quarantined, do not let him remain in hiding or in denial, for it is surely Tzara’as underneath the façade, just as he is surely Tamei.
It therefore follows that a person who suffers from a Michyah is pronounced Tamei both because of his misdeeds and his denial. Therefore, when the Tzara’as spreads across his entire body, it no longer reflects his denial; rather, it reflects quite the opposite. Therefore, once he overcomes the denial of his problem, the Tzara’as reflects his new attitude, spreads across his body, and he is pronounced Tahor. Then he gets started on fixing the actual misdeed, the process of ridding the Nega from his body altogether. He reenters a state of Tumah, but slowly fights it off until he is Tahor again.
The symptom of the changing hair, it seems to me, is not on either end of the spectrum of people treated for Tzara’as. For people who are affected by their Nega, people who come to the realization that they are being punished for their sins and resolve to come clean, their spiritual affliction is best represented by the Nega on their skin affecting them physically, and the simplest possible change is just for the nearby hairs to turn white as well. Some of these people are more certain of their mistakes than others, some are more like the patient in denial (in which case the Nega will first spread throughout the body; for further iyun, compare Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion in Mishnayos Nega’im 8:2 and 3) and some are more like the paranoid patient.
It’s very interesting how we can read these two paragraphs as the categorization of four different types of people, highlighted by two extremes and also mentioning two in between. It’s especially interesting when we consider that this is exactly the same as the categorization of the four different shades of Neg’aim, two extremes and two in between. The extreme of Beheres is the physical embodiment of paranoia, where the Nega spreads for all to see and is as bright as pure snow; now we see exactly why the paragraph of Pisyon exclusively mentions Behares in pasuk 4. Likewise, the paragraph of Michyah concerns itself with a patient who tries to conceal the Nega, so pasuk 10 naturally refers to the Tzara’as as Si’eis! So for the in between conditions, we would expect a medium shade; therefore, the pasukim regarding white hairs mention the generic term Lavan!
When we dig beneath the surface of just these first two paragraphs, we come to realize that there is so much more to spiritual affliction than good deed and bad deed. It is not even the deeds of the person that is reflected by his physical appearance, but rather his psyche, the mentality with which he approaches his dilemma. We come to see how this is no antiquated lesson, that even today, though we don’t categorize our attitudes of paranoia or denial through white blotches on our skin, we recognize our attitude towards even everyday circumstances to have an incredible effect on our success or failure. The lessons of Tazria and Metzorah truly are demanding and a challenge to fully take to heart in our modern times, but in many ways, these lessons are more real than even oxen or whips. One might even suggest that these lessons are the very foundation of our personal makeup…
Rabbi Simlaei said: Just as the creation of Man came after the creation of animals, beasts, and birds, so too his Torah is explained after the Torah of the animals, beasts, and birds.
VaYikra, Rashi 12:2
Perhaps what makes Parashat Nega’im so challenging isn’t even the overwhelming deluge of antiquated law, for we could still associate the physical blemish with spiritual impropriety, instead of with ritual impurity. But to view the Nega as the physical embodiment of Tumah, like one views a carcass, one would never expect to find a law that a man covered head to toe with Tzara’as is pure (13:13)! Clearly the person and not the Nega is what’s impure (see 13:3 Rashi D”H ViTimei Oso), not that this helps us understand the Torah’s ruling here; it still seems to be the epitomic Gezeiras HaKasuv, the law that defies all logic and reasoning.
Though the logic of this law, the head-to-toe Tzara’as, seems hopelessly broken, we should not neglect to note that the pasuk’s placement is equally baffling. The description of regular Nega’im developing on healthy skin spans two separate pesuchos in our parasha. The first deals with the symptom of Pisyon, spreading, while the second relates the laws of the symptom Michyah, healthy flesh in the center of the Nega. Here’s some quick background: in order for the Nega to be Tamei, it has to be white and either 1) turn two hairs white, 2) spread after first being examined by the Kohein, or 3) have a Michyah. One would expect to find the law of head-to-toe Tzara’as in the section about Pisyon, yet it appears within the context of the Michyah. Very strange.
This leads us to wonder why, of all the parashiot in Tazria, healthy skin should be given two separate pesuchot altogether. Burns and boils share one, and Nesek Bohak Karachas and Gabachas share one with all of Tzara’as Begadim (each type listed above at least gets its own stumah, except Karachas and Gabachas). Surely there must be something truly unique about each paragraph, some reason why the rest of the parasha categorizes by blemish but these two paragraphs categorize by symptom, but what? Let’s first analyze how these two paragraphs are different, and once we recognize their differences, perhaps we will be able to identify the unique nature of each symptom’s tale. Maybe then we’ll understand a little more about this head-to-toe Tzara’as and what reasoning may warrant its baffling laws.
1) Starting from the beginning, each paragraph opens with the development of a Nega, but in the first paragraph, henceforth called Pisyon, we read “Adam Ki Yiheeyeh ViOr Bissaro… ViHaya ViOr Bissaro LiNega Tzara’as,” while the second paragraph, Michyah, reads “Nega Tzara’as Ki Siheeyeh BiAdam.”
2) In Pisyon, the Nega is then “Huva El Aharon HaKohein O’ El Achad MiBanav HaKohanim,” but in Michyah, it is only “Huva El HaKohein.”
3) In Pisyon, we entertain the possibility that the Nega does or doesn’t have hair in it (pasukim 3 and 4, respectively). But in Michyah, we only mention the case where the Nega has hair and is Tamei, not the scenario where it doesn’t have hair and is Tahor.
4) In Pisyon, we regard the Nega as Baheres (13:4), the brightest of all four shades of white (again, see Mishnayos Negayim 1:1). But in Michyah, the Nega is exclusively called Se’ais (13:10), the weakest shade, though Rashi comments that a Michyah could halachically affect any shade of white, even Baheres.
5) Each paragraph refers to “Nega Tzara’as” in at least one place (13:2, 3, and 9). Rashi notes in pasuk 9 that the term Negah is lashon zachar (this is clear from pasukim 5, 6,and 17) while Tzara’as is lashon nikeivah (see pasukim 12 and 13). But in pasuk 3, the term Negah Tzara’as is lashon zachar (Hu), while in pasuk 9, the term is nikeivah (Ki Siheeyeh).
While we’re on the topic of lashon zachar and nikeivah, let’s analyze a few more pasukim and try to figure out what lashonos the rest of our parasha’s terms are. Adam, it goes without saying, is zachar. Se’ais and Baheres are both lashon nikeivah; Se’ais is proven from pasuk 10, Baheres is clear from pasuk 4. Sopachas seems the same as Mispachas, which is clearly nikeivah based on pasuk 7, and the gemara in Shavuos 6b indeed writes about it in lashon nikeivah. Additionally, Basar is zachar (see pasuk 15), as is Sei’ar (see pasuk 3). Now that we have all these rules straight, the flip-flopping uses of lashonos zachar and nikeivah behind each and every pasuk can be understood.
Well, every pasuk but the first one, which says “Adam Ki Yiheeyeh ViOr Bissaro Se’ais O’ Sopachas…” What does Yiheeyeh refer to? It can’t belong to “ViOr Bissaro” otherwise the pasuk would leave out the Bais prefix. Technically, one could try to apply it to the term Adam, the only other lashon zachar term in the pasuk, but that would sound weird; the same would be true for the continuation of the pasuk, which reads, “ViHaya ViOr Vissaro LiNega Tzara’as.” What sense then can we make of this pasuk’s structure?
Looking back, pasuk 2 is the introduction to Pisyon, and it seems to directly contrast the phrase “Nega Tzara’as Ki Siheeyeh BiAdam” in pasuk 9, the introduction to Michyah. Pasuk 9 seems to describe a spot of Tzara’as, thus explaining why the pasuk describes it in lashon nikeivah, though a Kohein has not yet inspected it. In Pisyon, however, the pasuk says Nega Tzara’as Hu, the Nega is Tzara’as, only after the Kohein inspects it. So Michyah is highlighted by our certainty that the spot is Tzara’as. In contrast, Pisyon seems to be highlighted by our skepticism.
In essence, there are two types of people who are brought to the Kohein to get checked for Nega’im: the paranoid person who is always certain that every little mark on his body is a Nega, and the smug person who lives in denial of his problems. The smug person is dragged to the Kohein by his caring friends, hence that lashon of ViHuva, he is brought. Keep in mind that only a Kohein may pronounce Tzara’as Tamei or Tahor. Even if he doesn’t know the Dinim, a non-Kohein expert can instruct him regarding what to declare, so technically even non-Kohanim could check Nega’im if they know what to look for. Quite possibly, some of the best Nega inspectors were not even Kohanim. The paranoid person isn’t looking for Mussar from the Kohein (the Sifra talks about how before the Kohein would even check the Nega, he would first reprimand the patient for even thinking that he could have Tzara’as, such thoughts suggest that a person suspects himself guilty of terrible sins like Lashon Hara or Geiva, and a guilty conscience can be very telling sometimes); rather, he’s looking for the most accurate psak. He too is dragged to the Kohein, but by the non-Kohein expert, not his friends.
The paragraph about Pisyon details the story of the paranoid patient, a man dragged “LiAharon HaKohein O’ El Achad MiBanav HaKohanim,” which happens to be the phrase from which we learn out the law that only a Kohein and not an expert can pronounce Tumah and Tahara (see Sifsei Chachamim). The prospect of Tumas Tzara’as is made up in his mind – either through total fabrication or due to guilty conscience – hence the lashon zachar “Ki Yiheeyeh” and “ViHaya,” when the man thinks he has Tzara’as and brings it to the expert, he shall be brought [by the expert] to Aharon or one of his sons. We suspect the man is needlessly paranoid, but can’t rule out the chance that he may have Tzara’as until after inspecting him; therefore, the pasuk writes upon discovery, “Nega Tzara’as Hu.” In contrast, the paragraph of Michyah relates the story of a man in denial; everyone sees Nega’im spreading all over his body, so they drag him directly to the Kohein for his own good so he can begin his spiritual rehabilitation, hence the simple lashon ViHuva El HaKohein. Because of the certainty of his ailment, the pasukim don’t bother entertaining the chance that his Nega is not bright enough or that it doesn’t turn hairs white.
We can now return to our original conjecture that the spiritual ailment a person suffers could be reflected through his physical condition. Pisyon is the perfect physical embodiment of paranoia! The Nega spreads and spreads until it seizes practically his entire body. The Michya, the healthy skin, is the perfect physical embodiment of denial! In fact, the pasuk says “Tzara’as Noshenes Hee,” the Michyah is actually healthy skin with Tzara’as underneath, in hiding. Because the Tzra’as is healing from the inside out, we determine that it’s not really healing at all, and the Michyah, the physical reflection of the patient’s denial, becomes the incriminating sign. When the Kohein pronounces him Tamei, the pasuk adds two extra words. “Lo Yasgirenu,” do not keep him quarantined, do not let him remain in hiding or in denial, for it is surely Tzara’as underneath the façade, just as he is surely Tamei.
It therefore follows that a person who suffers from a Michyah is pronounced Tamei both because of his misdeeds and his denial. Therefore, when the Tzara’as spreads across his entire body, it no longer reflects his denial; rather, it reflects quite the opposite. Therefore, once he overcomes the denial of his problem, the Tzara’as reflects his new attitude, spreads across his body, and he is pronounced Tahor. Then he gets started on fixing the actual misdeed, the process of ridding the Nega from his body altogether. He reenters a state of Tumah, but slowly fights it off until he is Tahor again.
The symptom of the changing hair, it seems to me, is not on either end of the spectrum of people treated for Tzara’as. For people who are affected by their Nega, people who come to the realization that they are being punished for their sins and resolve to come clean, their spiritual affliction is best represented by the Nega on their skin affecting them physically, and the simplest possible change is just for the nearby hairs to turn white as well. Some of these people are more certain of their mistakes than others, some are more like the patient in denial (in which case the Nega will first spread throughout the body; for further iyun, compare Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion in Mishnayos Nega’im 8:2 and 3) and some are more like the paranoid patient.
It’s very interesting how we can read these two paragraphs as the categorization of four different types of people, highlighted by two extremes and also mentioning two in between. It’s especially interesting when we consider that this is exactly the same as the categorization of the four different shades of Neg’aim, two extremes and two in between. The extreme of Beheres is the physical embodiment of paranoia, where the Nega spreads for all to see and is as bright as pure snow; now we see exactly why the paragraph of Pisyon exclusively mentions Behares in pasuk 4. Likewise, the paragraph of Michyah concerns itself with a patient who tries to conceal the Nega, so pasuk 10 naturally refers to the Tzara’as as Si’eis! So for the in between conditions, we would expect a medium shade; therefore, the pasukim regarding white hairs mention the generic term Lavan!
When we dig beneath the surface of just these first two paragraphs, we come to realize that there is so much more to spiritual affliction than good deed and bad deed. It is not even the deeds of the person that is reflected by his physical appearance, but rather his psyche, the mentality with which he approaches his dilemma. We come to see how this is no antiquated lesson, that even today, though we don’t categorize our attitudes of paranoia or denial through white blotches on our skin, we recognize our attitude towards even everyday circumstances to have an incredible effect on our success or failure. The lessons of Tazria and Metzorah truly are demanding and a challenge to fully take to heart in our modern times, but in many ways, these lessons are more real than even oxen or whips. One might even suggest that these lessons are the very foundation of our personal makeup…
Rabbi Simlaei said: Just as the creation of Man came after the creation of animals, beasts, and birds, so too his Torah is explained after the Torah of the animals, beasts, and birds.
VaYikra, Rashi 12:2
1.4.05
Parashat Shimini
The Midrash Tanchuma explains the concept of Beheima Temei’ah through a mashal: A doctor visits two patients. To the first he says, “you may eat whatever you like,” and to the second he says, “such and such should you eat, and such and such should you not eat.” When they later ask the doctor why he gave such different orders, he explains, “I saw the first patient was going to die anyhow, so I figured he might as well eat what he likes. I saw the second patient had the opportunity to live, so I gave him a diet that would increase his chances of survival.”
The Midrash implies that there is a distinct difference between the properties of Beheimos Temei’os and Beheimos Taharos, more than just the fact that Hashem commanded us not to eat them; non-Kosher animals are harmful to us, and therefore we should stick to Kosher animals. However, a question arises in the next few pasukim when the Torah lists the four animals that bear only one Siman Tahara, the Gamal Shafan Arnevet and Chazir, and offers a peculiar reason for the prohibition of their consumption. “Do not eat [this animal], for it chews its cud, and it does not have split hooves, it is Tamei to you.” (except for the pig, which has split hooves but does not chew its cud) If the pasuk wants to tell us not to eat these animals, it should just inform us which Siman it lacks. Why mention both Simanim? Perhaps the pasuk is detailing our need to check for both Simanim, so it writes the prohibition in an investigative manner. “Let’s see… it chews its cud… oh, but it doesn’t have split hooves. So don’t eat it.” But then the pasuk should say “Ki Ma’aleh Geira Hu, Aval Parsah Lo Hifris;” by connecting the two Simanim through a Vav, the pasuk implies that the Kosher Siman is as important as the missing Siman regarding the animal’s Tumah.
The Kli Yakar explains: We can explain on this matter that the Tahor Siman adds to its Tumah, for these animals portray themselves to be Tahor, but after we look closer, we discover that they are really Tamei. This is why the gemara compares these four animals to the four oppressive kingdoms, Bavel Madai Yavan and Edom. These nations sometimes seemed to help the Jews, aid their learning of Torah or help them build the Beis HaMikdash, but in reality, each of them was evil. (See Rashi Beraishis 26:34).
The Kli Yakar therefore concludes that these animals are more Tamei than animals without any Kosher sign, than animals that at least don’t pretend to be Kosher. So these four animals still fall under the overall prohibition, they are still considered repulsive; in fact, the reason we go out of our way to list the Siman each possesses is to show how it is more repulsive to us. One would therefore speculate that these four animals carry a Tzad Chamur over all the other Beheimos Tamei’os of the world. The Sifra teaches us exactly the opposite.
“MiBisaram Lo Tocheilu. This refers to the violation of eating the Gamal Shafan Arnevet or Chazir, the only four animals with only one Siman Tahara. Hence, I would only think these are forbidden, but other animals with no Siman would not fall under this violation (this violation, as opposed to the one in pasuk 3, is a Lo Ta’aseih, and if only these four animals fall within the Lav, then one would only get Malkos for eating these four animals). But if these four animals that at least have one Siman Tahara are forbidden, then Kal ViChomeir animals that don’t even have one Siman are forbidden [by this pasuk, and so they are Malkos-worthy offenses as well].”
Rashi, VaYikra (11:8)
The Sifra somehow uses this Kal ViChomeir to include all animals in the violation of this Lo Ta’asei, thus meting out lashes for even the consumption of horse or dog. But didn’t we just show from these pasukim themselves that the Lav was specifically only meant for the most Tamei of animals, the one’s that pretend to be Tahor?! From where does the Sifra come up with this Kal ViChomeir?! We will surely need to reconsider our understanding of these pasukim and these statements from the Sifra and Tanchuma, but this time, we shall do so through the control of Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria’s lesson:
Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria said: From where do we know that a person should not say [to himself], ‘I am disgusted by pork,’ or ‘it’s simply impossible to wear Kila’im,’ that he should rather declare ‘I wish I could eat pork or wear Kila’im, but what can I do? My father in Heaven has commanded me not to.’? It states in the pasuk, VaAvdil Eschem Min Ha’Amim LeHiyos Li, that He has separated us for the sake of His name, and that we should stay away from sin with intention to be to be Mikabeil Ol Malchus Shamayim.”
Rashi, VaYikra (20:26)
Rabbi Elazar seems to stress the idea that a Mitzvah should be difficult, that the effort we put into their fulfillment is factored into our ultimate reward. But we wonder, is it truly so terrible to be repulsed by pork? Is it really necessary for one to wish he could eat it? When one recognizes the reasons he shouldn’t eat Beheimos Temei’os, like the Midrash Tanchuma explained, he will surely become repulsed by them and their damaging effects, and that will lessen the Schar he receives for fulfilling the Mitzvah?! At the heart of Rabbi Elazar’s lesson, it seems, is the order to like pork. It’s a strange encouragement; really, what if a person truly dislikes the smell of bacon? Should he try to like it, try to wish he could eat it, somehow irrationally convince himself that he loves the taste of bacon? What a strange lesson Rabbi Elazar would be teaching us then. Perhaps there is motivation to like pork, and perhaps it’s based on our parasha. Perhaps this whole concept of repulsion towards Beheimos Tamei’os wasn’t really the Midrash Tanchuma’s intended lesson.
There are two ways to approach the prohibition of Beheimos Tamei’os. Either all animals are considered Kosher except for those which lack the proper Simanim, and these lackings make them harmful for our well being, whether physical or spiritual. Or all animals are considered not-Kosher, except for those with beneficial aspects, those with the proper Simanim, and those Simanim are what are healthy for us to eat. In other words, we can either view the horse to have spiritual cholesterol and fats, or we can view the cow to have spiritual vitamins. And the Sifra’s Kal ViChomeir tells us exactly which of these two approaches is true. The Kal ViChomeir isn’t drawn from animals with one Siman Tuma to animals with two Simanei Tuma; there’s no such thing as a Siman Tuma! Rather, animals with one Siman Tahara provide a Kal ViComeir for animals with no Simanei Tahara; the prohibition of eating animals with some spiritual vitamins provide a Kal ViChomeir for animals with no spiritual vitamins.
The Midrash Tanchuma is therefore not comparing our case to a patient who wants to know why the doctor has restricted his diet and a doctor who answers it’s for the sake of the patient’s health that he stay away from harmful foods. Rather, the doctor is forcing the patient to take his vitamins, and to not waste his time on foods that do not contain the proper sustenance, and he explains to the patient why he didn’t bother making the other patient’s life miserable too. If we approach Simanei Tahara this way, then we can understand why Gamal or Shafan is not nearly as abominable as horse or dog; at least they contain some spiritual vitamins.
The Torah therefore goes out of its way to tell us that only one Siman Tahara is not enough to justify the consumption of pig or camel etc. While one Siman is better than none, we recognize that these animals actually have an added level of Tumah to them that counteracts their positive aspects, for they are like the most despicable nations of the world in that they embody the notion of being only half good, to permit the existence of a Jewish nation but deny our ability to learn Torah, like Malchus Edom did.
We eat Kosher animals because of the positive aspects to their consumption, so one might think he may eat pork for his personal well being; after all, it does have a Siman Tahara. Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria therefore teaches us that one may not simply because Hashem commanded him not to. One may make a similar mistake by Sha’atneiz. One reason given for the prohibition of Levishas Kila’im is that the Egyptian priests used to wear Sha’atneiz clothing when doing their Avoda. One would perhaps think that for this very reason we should wear Kila’im, for the Mitzrim’s practice is a testament to the quality and value of the clothing. Hashem, however, tells us not to wear them, for they too embody the practice of another nation. The first step for us to be a nation of Hashem’s is to dissociate ourselves from these forbidden objects, these things that are only forbidden because of their uses in other cultures. And if we look closely at that Rashi in (20:26), we realize that Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria’s lesson was in fact the continuation of this very point. The Rashi begins…
“VaAvdil Eschem... LiHiyos Li. If you stay separate from other [nations], then you will be My [nation]. But if not, then you will be Nevuchadnetzar’s. [And] Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria said…”
The Midrash implies that there is a distinct difference between the properties of Beheimos Temei’os and Beheimos Taharos, more than just the fact that Hashem commanded us not to eat them; non-Kosher animals are harmful to us, and therefore we should stick to Kosher animals. However, a question arises in the next few pasukim when the Torah lists the four animals that bear only one Siman Tahara, the Gamal Shafan Arnevet and Chazir, and offers a peculiar reason for the prohibition of their consumption. “Do not eat [this animal], for it chews its cud, and it does not have split hooves, it is Tamei to you.” (except for the pig, which has split hooves but does not chew its cud) If the pasuk wants to tell us not to eat these animals, it should just inform us which Siman it lacks. Why mention both Simanim? Perhaps the pasuk is detailing our need to check for both Simanim, so it writes the prohibition in an investigative manner. “Let’s see… it chews its cud… oh, but it doesn’t have split hooves. So don’t eat it.” But then the pasuk should say “Ki Ma’aleh Geira Hu, Aval Parsah Lo Hifris;” by connecting the two Simanim through a Vav, the pasuk implies that the Kosher Siman is as important as the missing Siman regarding the animal’s Tumah.
The Kli Yakar explains: We can explain on this matter that the Tahor Siman adds to its Tumah, for these animals portray themselves to be Tahor, but after we look closer, we discover that they are really Tamei. This is why the gemara compares these four animals to the four oppressive kingdoms, Bavel Madai Yavan and Edom. These nations sometimes seemed to help the Jews, aid their learning of Torah or help them build the Beis HaMikdash, but in reality, each of them was evil. (See Rashi Beraishis 26:34).
The Kli Yakar therefore concludes that these animals are more Tamei than animals without any Kosher sign, than animals that at least don’t pretend to be Kosher. So these four animals still fall under the overall prohibition, they are still considered repulsive; in fact, the reason we go out of our way to list the Siman each possesses is to show how it is more repulsive to us. One would therefore speculate that these four animals carry a Tzad Chamur over all the other Beheimos Tamei’os of the world. The Sifra teaches us exactly the opposite.
“MiBisaram Lo Tocheilu. This refers to the violation of eating the Gamal Shafan Arnevet or Chazir, the only four animals with only one Siman Tahara. Hence, I would only think these are forbidden, but other animals with no Siman would not fall under this violation (this violation, as opposed to the one in pasuk 3, is a Lo Ta’aseih, and if only these four animals fall within the Lav, then one would only get Malkos for eating these four animals). But if these four animals that at least have one Siman Tahara are forbidden, then Kal ViChomeir animals that don’t even have one Siman are forbidden [by this pasuk, and so they are Malkos-worthy offenses as well].”
Rashi, VaYikra (11:8)
The Sifra somehow uses this Kal ViChomeir to include all animals in the violation of this Lo Ta’asei, thus meting out lashes for even the consumption of horse or dog. But didn’t we just show from these pasukim themselves that the Lav was specifically only meant for the most Tamei of animals, the one’s that pretend to be Tahor?! From where does the Sifra come up with this Kal ViChomeir?! We will surely need to reconsider our understanding of these pasukim and these statements from the Sifra and Tanchuma, but this time, we shall do so through the control of Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria’s lesson:
Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria said: From where do we know that a person should not say [to himself], ‘I am disgusted by pork,’ or ‘it’s simply impossible to wear Kila’im,’ that he should rather declare ‘I wish I could eat pork or wear Kila’im, but what can I do? My father in Heaven has commanded me not to.’? It states in the pasuk, VaAvdil Eschem Min Ha’Amim LeHiyos Li, that He has separated us for the sake of His name, and that we should stay away from sin with intention to be to be Mikabeil Ol Malchus Shamayim.”
Rashi, VaYikra (20:26)
Rabbi Elazar seems to stress the idea that a Mitzvah should be difficult, that the effort we put into their fulfillment is factored into our ultimate reward. But we wonder, is it truly so terrible to be repulsed by pork? Is it really necessary for one to wish he could eat it? When one recognizes the reasons he shouldn’t eat Beheimos Temei’os, like the Midrash Tanchuma explained, he will surely become repulsed by them and their damaging effects, and that will lessen the Schar he receives for fulfilling the Mitzvah?! At the heart of Rabbi Elazar’s lesson, it seems, is the order to like pork. It’s a strange encouragement; really, what if a person truly dislikes the smell of bacon? Should he try to like it, try to wish he could eat it, somehow irrationally convince himself that he loves the taste of bacon? What a strange lesson Rabbi Elazar would be teaching us then. Perhaps there is motivation to like pork, and perhaps it’s based on our parasha. Perhaps this whole concept of repulsion towards Beheimos Tamei’os wasn’t really the Midrash Tanchuma’s intended lesson.
There are two ways to approach the prohibition of Beheimos Tamei’os. Either all animals are considered Kosher except for those which lack the proper Simanim, and these lackings make them harmful for our well being, whether physical or spiritual. Or all animals are considered not-Kosher, except for those with beneficial aspects, those with the proper Simanim, and those Simanim are what are healthy for us to eat. In other words, we can either view the horse to have spiritual cholesterol and fats, or we can view the cow to have spiritual vitamins. And the Sifra’s Kal ViChomeir tells us exactly which of these two approaches is true. The Kal ViChomeir isn’t drawn from animals with one Siman Tuma to animals with two Simanei Tuma; there’s no such thing as a Siman Tuma! Rather, animals with one Siman Tahara provide a Kal ViComeir for animals with no Simanei Tahara; the prohibition of eating animals with some spiritual vitamins provide a Kal ViChomeir for animals with no spiritual vitamins.
The Midrash Tanchuma is therefore not comparing our case to a patient who wants to know why the doctor has restricted his diet and a doctor who answers it’s for the sake of the patient’s health that he stay away from harmful foods. Rather, the doctor is forcing the patient to take his vitamins, and to not waste his time on foods that do not contain the proper sustenance, and he explains to the patient why he didn’t bother making the other patient’s life miserable too. If we approach Simanei Tahara this way, then we can understand why Gamal or Shafan is not nearly as abominable as horse or dog; at least they contain some spiritual vitamins.
The Torah therefore goes out of its way to tell us that only one Siman Tahara is not enough to justify the consumption of pig or camel etc. While one Siman is better than none, we recognize that these animals actually have an added level of Tumah to them that counteracts their positive aspects, for they are like the most despicable nations of the world in that they embody the notion of being only half good, to permit the existence of a Jewish nation but deny our ability to learn Torah, like Malchus Edom did.
We eat Kosher animals because of the positive aspects to their consumption, so one might think he may eat pork for his personal well being; after all, it does have a Siman Tahara. Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria therefore teaches us that one may not simply because Hashem commanded him not to. One may make a similar mistake by Sha’atneiz. One reason given for the prohibition of Levishas Kila’im is that the Egyptian priests used to wear Sha’atneiz clothing when doing their Avoda. One would perhaps think that for this very reason we should wear Kila’im, for the Mitzrim’s practice is a testament to the quality and value of the clothing. Hashem, however, tells us not to wear them, for they too embody the practice of another nation. The first step for us to be a nation of Hashem’s is to dissociate ourselves from these forbidden objects, these things that are only forbidden because of their uses in other cultures. And if we look closely at that Rashi in (20:26), we realize that Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria’s lesson was in fact the continuation of this very point. The Rashi begins…
“VaAvdil Eschem... LiHiyos Li. If you stay separate from other [nations], then you will be My [nation]. But if not, then you will be Nevuchadnetzar’s. [And] Rabbi Elazar Ben Azaria said…”
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