Parashat VaYikra

“And [the Korban Oleh] will appease on [its owner’s] behalf.” On what [transgression] does it appease? If you say on [transgressions that incur] Kares, Misas Beis Din, Misah Bidei Shamayim, or Malkos, [this Korban cannot be their remedy for] their punishments are explicit[ly stated in the Torah]. This [Korban] must appease [exclusively for the transgression of] a Mitzvas Assei and a Lav that can be rectified with an Assei [for these transgressions have no explicit remedies].

Rashi, VaYikra 1:4

The Ramban questions Rashi’s deduction. The Torah only specifies punishments for intentional transgressions, but if one sins accidentally, he does not get Kares, Misah, or Malkos. Why then, the Ramban wonders, can’t the Olah appease for those accidental sins as well?

In Rashi’s defense, the Ramban suggests that the Torah would have specified the punishment for the Aveira BiShogeig had there been a punishment. The Torah’s silence on the matter is itself a proof that one owes no appeasement for an accidental sin. This is implicit from Rashi’s blanket statement, “their punishments are explicit,” suggesting that all existent consequences for such actions are already stated in the Torah.

A lot of confusion stems from the blending of two ideas, punishment and appeasement. To illustrate the confusion at hand, consider the Ramban’s hypothetical outlook on the purpose of a Korban Olah. The pasuk states that the Olah appeases G-d, and Rashi questions for what it appeases. However, one does not attempt to appease in cases where he has already incurred a punishment; were this so, one could have brought an Olah to avoid or allay Chivei Kares and Chivei Misah. Additionally, one does not attempt to appease in cases where he has not incurred a punishment; were this so, one could have brought an Olah for Aveiros BiShogeig. According to the Ramban, then, when does one attempt to appease G-d?

According to the Ramban, the window for appeasement over an Aveirah exists only when Hashem does not explicitly commit towards meting a certain punishment within the Torah. In other words, Hashem punishes man for violating Mitzvos Assei, but Hashem does not explicitly commit to the punishment; therefore, if one attempts appeasement for such an Aveirah, Hashem would accept his appeasement and forgo his due punishment.

Note closely that the Olah is itself not considered a punishment, nor is its offering a consequence of the owner’s misdeeds. Rather, one who brings an Olah attains a closeness to Hashem that indirectly saves him from due Onesh. Rashi expresses this notion within his opening comments to the Korban Olah.

“When a man brings from you,” The pasuk speaks of a donated offering.

Rashi, VaYikra 1:2

The Levush HaOrah explains Rashi’s inference. The pasuk sounds as if it singles out an individual from among the crowd as the owner of this Korban; however, “when a man from [among] you brings” would be more grammatically accurate. The attachment of “from you” to the act of bringing expresses the inspiration behind this offering, that the individual inspires himself to come closer to Hashem and is not influenced by external sources. Therefore, if one brings an Olah out of obligation or any feeling of necessity, it cannot accomplish the appeasement discussed in our parasha. Furthermore, the Olah does not necessarily directly accomplish any appeasement.

Rava said, “The Korban Olah is [merely] a gift [and cannot atone for any sin]. If he has not yet done Teshuva, then ‘a sacrifice of the wicked is abominable’ (Mishlei 21:27). And if he has done Teshuva, then the Breissa says his atonement [for the violation of a Mitzvas Assei] depends on Mechila [and not a Korban]. Rather, it must be a gift.

Meseches Zevachim, 7b

At first glance, Rava’s stance blatantly contradicts Rashi’s assessment of the Olah. This is more of a difficulty for Rava than it is for Rashi, since Rashi’s opinion is really that of the Tanna Rabbi Akiva (see Meseches Yoma, 36a). However, if one accepts that the Korban is itself not the atonement but rather an appeasement of Hashem’s anger, then the Korban can itself encourage the necessary Mechila. Rava therefore agrees that the Korban does more than just transfer one’s property to Hashem’s possession; the Korban, by virtue of its status as a gift, encourages the Mechila necessary for Kapara.