Parashat Kedoshim

Fear your mother and father, and keep My Shabbosim, I am Hashem your G-d.

VaYikra 19:3

“And keep My Shabbosim,” [the Torah] places the observance of Shabbos next to fear of one’s father to state that although you are warned to fear your father, if he orders you to profane the Shabbos, do not listen to him. And [do listen to him when he tells you to violate] all other Mitzvos.

Rashi, VaYikra 19:3

Our parasha opens with two fundamental precepts. Rashi infers from their juxtaposition that the weight of Shabbos overwhelms one’s obligation to fear his father. But how does Rashi know which Mitzvah overwhelms the other? Perhaps the pasuk implies that one should disregard the Shabbos to fulfill his father’s command. From where does Rashi’s proof come?

The Mizrachi takes issue with Rashi’s reasoning. At the opening of Parashat VaYakheil, Moshe Rabbeinu instructs the nation to observe the Shabbos and then tells them to build the Mishkan. Rashi infers there that Moshe mentions Shmiras Shabbos before Meleches HaMishkan to express that one should not build the Mishkan on Shabbos. When confronted with a conflict between two juxtaposed Mitzvos, Rashi apparently prioritizes the former Mitzvah over the latter. (Indeed, Rashi applies this same axiom later in our parasha, 19:30, where Shmiras Shabbos precedes Meleches HaMishkan.) By this measure, when confronted with Mora Av and Shmiras Shabbos, Rashi should prioritize the former Mitzvah, Mora Av. Why does Rashi deviate from his usual axiom?

The Mizrachi challenges Rashi’s inference from an alternative angle. Rashi interprets the closing of the pasuk, “I am Hashem,” to establish a hierarchy between man, his father, and G-d. One must obey Hashem instead of his father because Hashem is also his father’s G-d. Both he and his father must obey G-d’s commandments; therefore, a father no right to tell his son to violate the Torah. Rashi here, the Mizrchi notes, seems to repeat his initial inference. Does Rashi really need two sources, a juxtaposition and a logical appeal, to derive a hierarchy between Mora Av and Shmiras Shabbos?

To answer these questions, the Mizrachi additionally notes that the disobedience of one’s father is itself a violation of the Torah. Therefore, when one’s father orders him to profane the Shabbos (or violate any other Mitzvah for that matter), he inevitably will either forgo his obligation to keep the Shabbos or his obligation to obey his father. Perhaps it is impossible to reconcile this conflict, and therefore one may choose whichever approach he deems most appropriate. Our pasuk therefore juxtaposes these two Mitzvos, thereby recognizing this conflict as having a just resolution and suggesting that one Mitzvah outright overwhelms the other. And which Mitzvah is the stronger? By closing “I am Hashem,” the pasuk logically prioritizes Shmiras Shabbos above Mora Av.

However, the Mizrachi’s approach does not sit well with me. First of all, the Mizrachi totally disregards Rashi’s axiom regarding the priority of a Mitzvah listed directly before another seemingly unrelated Mitzvah. The Mizrachi apparently does away with this axiom because the closing of the pasuk poses a strong contradiction. Nonetheless, the Mizrachi would still hold of this axiom in other instances, which leaves me to wonder why this pasuk can’t simply list Shmiras Shabbos before Mora Av and entirely do away with its closing. What more do we learn from the pasuk in its current state?

I must confess, by my feeble understanding of Rashi, I cannot agree with the Mizrachi that Rashi subscribes to any such axiom in the first place. In Parashat VaYakheil, Moshe opens with three pasukim devoted to the observance of Shabbos; the rest of his speech discusses Meleches HaMishkan. Clearly, the main topic of Moshe’s speech is Meleches HaMishkan. Why then does Moshe preface his speech with a remark about Shmiras Shabbos? If the obligation to build the Mishkan overpowers the need to keep Shabbos, then there would be no need for Moshe to mention Shmiras Shabbos, especially not before addressing his primary topic. One must therefore conclude that Moshe delayed his instruction of Meleches HaMishkan on order to discuss a Mitzvah of greater priority, namely Shmiras Shabbos. However, Rashi cannot apply any such inference to the juxtaposition of our pasuk for Parashat Kedoshim does not address any single central topic. Rashi must resort to some alternative method by which to reconcile the conflicting Mitzvos.

But before one can even begin to consider Rashi’s method of reconciliation between these conflicting Mitzvos, one must identify the source of his inference. Does Rashi’s inference come from the juxtaposition within the opening of the pasuk, or does it derive from the logical hierarchy expressed afterward? Rashi comments that one should not violate any Mitzvah by his father’s command, and his comment appears in connection to the command to keep the Shabbos. Rashi’s placement of this comment implies that his primary inference, namely that Shmiras Shabbos (and other Mitzvos for that matter) overpowers the obligation of Mora Av, precedes his interpretation of “I am Hashem.” But what then is the purpose of the pasuk’s closing passage?

Stepping back for a second, one must question the relevance of Shabbos within the pasuk altogether. If Rashi infers from “ViEs Shabsosai Tishmoru” that all Mitzvos take priority over Mora Av, then there’s nothing special about the Mitzvah of Shabbos to warrant its mention in the pasuk. All things considered, Rashi should infer the importance of Shabbos from the juxtaposition and interpret “I am Hashem” as the general concept of disregarding one’s parent’s orders when they conflict any other Mitzvah. (Indeed, the Sifsei Chachamim implies towards such an understanding of Rashi’s words. However, I cannot bring myself to agree with their approach, primarily because of Rashi’s strange placement of the comment “and so too all other Mitzvos.”)

Similar difficulties emerge from a gemara in Bava Metziya:

How do we know that if one’s father forbids him from returning a lost object that he must not listen to [his father]? “Fear your mother and father, and keep My Shabbosim, I am Hashem,” you are all obligated to honor Me. Because the pasuk states “keep my Shabbosim” [this inference works]. Presumably had the pasuk not stated [“keep my Shabbosim”], I would think otherwise. But why? [Kibud Av] is [only] a Mitzvas Assei and this [other Mitzvah] is both an Assei and a Lo Sa’asei? [In reality, “keep my Shabbosim”] is needed, otherwise I would have thought that [the Torah] equates Kibud Av to Kavod Hashem (for it states “Honor your parents” in Shemos and “Honor your G-d” in Mishlei). [“Keep My Shabbosim”] therefore teaches us not to listen to one’s father [when he orders you to violate any Mitzvah in the Torah, in spite of the weight of your obligation to honor him.]

Mesechet Bava Metziya, 32a

The gemara focuses on the significance of the clause “keep My Shabbosim.” Had the pasuk not contained this clause, one would think that the obligation to honor his parents outweighs his obligation to honor Hashem. But startlingly, the gemara isn’t discussing the obligation of Shmiras Shabbos altogether; rather, the gemara focuses solely on the obligation to return lost objects (also contrary to one’s father’s orders). Why then does the gemara involve itself so closely with a clause about Shmiras Shabbos. The gemara opens with a far more versatile inference, “I am Hashem, you are all obligated to honor Me,” yet it inexplicably abandons this drasha in favor of the pasuk’s former half.

Rashi takes a curious approach to his commentary on this gemara. Regarding the drasha of “I am Hashem,” Rashi elaborates, “and if your father tells you to violate Shabbos, do not listen to him,” suggesting that the Mitzvah our gemara discusses is exclusively Shmiras Shabbos. Immediately afterward, when the gemara challenges that “this Mitzvah” is both an Assei and Lo Sa’asei, Rashi identifies these two Mitzvos as “Hasheiv Tishiveim” and “Lo Suchal LiHisaleim,” suggesting that our gemara solely discusses Hashavas Aveidah. Is Rashi inconsistent?

Let’s summarize Rashi’s assessment. From the words “I am Hashem,” we infer that a parent cannot order his son to violate Shabbos. From the words, “keep My Shabbosim,” we infer that a parent cannot order his son to violate any other Mitzvah in the Torah. This itself is an outright difficulty, for if any clause in our pasuk involves the laws of Shrimas Shabbos, it is “keep My Shabbosim!”

I would like to propose a radical resolution to Rashi’s approach. The Mitzvah of Shmiras Shabbos differs from all other Mitzvos in that it directly acknowledges Hashem’s creation of and interaction with the world. Therefore, Shmiras Shabbos, more than any other mitzvah, expresses Kavod to Hashem. Therefore, if one is obligated to both “Honor [his] parents” and “Honor [his] G-d,” he will only be confronted with a dilemma when his parents order him to forgo the honor he shows G-d. In other words, if one’s father ordered him to violate Shabbos, he would not know who’s Kavod takes precedence, and therefore he would not know what to do. Our pasuk “I am Hashem,” presumably comes along to establish the hierarchy between the Kavod one expresses for his G-d and for his father. Even the father owes respect to Hashem; therefore, one’s father may not order him to violate Shabbos.

The performance of other mitzvos, however, does not express Kavod to Hashem. Presumably, one’s father could then order him to violate these mitzvos because the Torah equates Kibud Av to Kavod Shamayim. How does our pasuk contest this assumption? Had the pasuk stated “Fear your mother and father, I am Hashem,” one would have known to listen to his father’s orders so long as they did not interfere with Kavod Shamayim. In other words, even of the pasuk did not explicitly state Shmiras Shabbos, one would know to keep Shabbos in spite of his parents’ contrary orders. Why then must the pasuk explicitly state “keep My Shabbosim?” Perhaps we infer from this extraneous clause that one’s obligation to keep Shabbos in spite of his parents’ contrary wishes surpasses his need to show Kavod to Hashem. Instead, the mitzvah of Shmiras Shabbos is a mitzvah like any other mitzvah stated in the Torah, and any mitzvah written in the Torah stands in strong opposition to Mora Av.

We can now understand the gemara in Bava Metziya. Without the explicit declaration, “keep My Shabbosim,” one would never equate Shmiras Shabbos to all other Mitzvos and would assume that only Shmiras Shabbos supersedes the contrary orders of one’s parents because of the Kavod Shamayim it expresses. Once the pasuk states both “keep My Shabbosim” and “I am Hashem,” we infer that when we weigh the obligation of Shmiras Shabbos against Mora Av, we must consider more than the Kavod Shamayim involved. We must also consider its nature as a Mitzvah, in spite of one’s obligation to honor his parents. Therefore, “all other Mitzvos” too outweigh Kibud Av (for if one’s priority were the reverse, there would be no point in mentioning Shmiras Shabbos in our pasuk).

And why should these “other Mitzvos” outweigh the Mitzvah of Kibud Av? Perhaps we can infer a third fundamental precept from this opening pasuk. Perhaps when one’s father commands him to violate any Mitzvah, one can no longer consider his fulfillment of his father’s wishes to itself constitute a Mitzvah. No circumstance can transform an Aveirah into a Mitzvah. In a way, our drasha concludes that there is no conflict between Mitzvos in our pasuk. Rather, the only Mitzvah that exists is the upholding of Hashem’s Torah, to the contrary of one’s father’s orders.