Parashat Yisro

In his introductory comments to Ma’amad Har Sinai, Rashi questions whether one could be punished for violating the Aseres HaDibros. “Since there are [commandments] in the Torah for which man receives reward [for fulfilling these commandments] and is not punished for not [fulfilling them],” Rashi surmises, “one might think the same of the Aseres HaDibros.” Rashi quashes this supposition with a quote from the Mechilta:

VaYidabeir Elokim. [Why Elokim and not Hashem?] The name Elokim invariably refers to [His nature as a] Judge to punish [for transgression] and [as a] trustworthy Payer of reward.

Mechilta, Yisro, Parasha 4

The Mechilta’s function is readily obvious; G-d presents Himself at the start of Mattan Torah as the awesome Being capable of meting fair punishment and reward. Rashi builds off this fundamental premise and suggests that its application to the Aseres HaDirbos in particular is itself a chiddush.

The Nachalas Ya’akov wonders, though, how much of a chiddush Rashi teaches us here. Presumably, Rashi admits that one could never escape the consequences of violating a Mitzvas Lo Sa’aseih, but there exist some Mitzvos Assei for which he cannot be punished. This leaves three Mitzvos within the Aseres HaDibros: Anochi Hashem; Shabbos; and Kibud Av VaAim. Shabbos is both a Mitzvas Assei and Lo Sa’asei (Lo Sa’aseh Kol Milacha), and belief in Hashem is so central to Jewish thought, it is impossible to think one could deny Hashem’s presence in the world and not deserve punishment.

By default, the mitzvah of Kibud Av Va’aim is the single mitzvah within the Aseres HaDibros that theoretically can only fulfilled but never violated. Hashem therefore introduces Himself as Elokim to emphasize how an avoidance of Kibud Av is itself a sin and worthy of punishment. Rashi himself supports this position elsewhere:

LiMa’an Ya’arichun Yamecha, so that you shall live long. If you honor [them,] your years will be lengthened, but if not, they will be shortened, for the words of Torah are abbreviated, and affirmative [commandments] imply prohibitive [commandments], and prohibitive [commandments] imply affirmative [commandments].

Rashi, Shemos 20:12

The Nachalas Ya’akov takes issue with this premise as a whole, though, for Chazal cite an account that suggests exactly the opposite:

Rami Bar Tamri went up to [the Babylonian city of] Sura… and approached Rav Chisda… He saw a man who would not honor his father or mother, so he attempted to beat [the man. Rav Chisda saw this and] said, “leave him, for all mitzvos with explicit rewards [such as Kibud Av] the human courts may not enforce.”

Meseches Chulin, 110a-110b

Evidently, the affirmative duty of Kibud Av implies no such converse prohibition. Rashi himself comments, “the explicit statement of reward [in the pasuk] suggests that its [only] punishment is [that one] not receive this reward.” How then can Rashi claim that Hashem will shorten one’s life for not fulfilling Kibud Av?

The Nachalas Ya’akov proposes an answer to his own question. Perhaps the human courts do not punish for the avoidance of Kibud Av, but the heavenly courts do. In other words, Rav Chisda stopped Rami bar Tamri from beating the man because the violation of Kibud Av is a matter left for Shamayim to judge. From the court’s perspective, the only consequence of Kibud Av is reward for its fulfillment, but Hashem will later judge each individual on the basis of his regard for the fulfillment of Mitzvos in general.

Another question emerges. For what mitzvos does Hashem refuse to punish? The Nachalas Ya’akov suggests such mitzvos as Tzitzis or Ma’aser, mitzvos that can be circumvented through cunning tricks. For instance, one must only give a tenth of the produce that enters through the door to his house, so if he brings it through the window, he can avoid the mitzvah of Ma’aser. Likewise, one must put Tzitzis on a four-cornered garment, but if his garment is round, he has no obligation whatsoever.

The Nachalas Ya’akov’s stance, however, creates a difficulty. The standard individual has parents and thereby immediately incurs the obligation to honor those parents. Logically, Hashem would not shorten the life of an orphan simply because he cannot fulfill Kibud Av. But those mitzvos for which Hashem doesn’t punish are never actually violated to begin with because the individual never incurs an obligation altogether. How then can Rashi compare Hashem’s unwillingness to punish individuals who avoid a mitzvah to Hashem’s approach regarding the actual transgression of Kibud Av?

The gemara in Meseches Menachos (41a) implies that the blatant avoidance of a mitzvah is itself a sin. The gemara relates an encounter between Ketiya and an angel. The angel asks Ketiya why he isn’t wearing Tzitzis on his garment. Although Ketiya wore a two cornered garment, and thereby not obligated in the mitzvah, the angel expresses displeasure with his lack of desire to fulfill the mitzvah. “Would I be punished for [not wearing] Tzitzis?” Ketiya asks, and the malach replies, “When G-d is angry.” Tosafos, in Meseches Arachin (2b), comments on the account. According to Tosafos, in Ketiya’s time, a standard garment had four corners; therefore, Ketiya’s choice to wear a two-cornered garment was itself a blatant refusal to incur the obligation of Tzitzis. Nowadays, however, garments commonly come without four distinct corners, and one who wears a “two-cornered garment” is not necessarily guilty of punishment like Ketiya.

The fact that an angel confronts Ketiya regarding his sin itself suggests that no person bothered Ketiya about his mistake. Perhaps this is because Tzitzis whose reward is explicitly recorded in the Torah. But what might that reward be?

“You can explain all blessing and curses [in the Torah] in this manner: If you serve G-d in happiness… you will distance yourself from the curses and leave yourself free to study the Torah so you will merit Olam Haba, and both your lives [in this world and the world to come] will be good…and if you forsake Hashem and sin… you will bring upon the curses until your lives are filled with panic and fear and you will have no heart with which to perform the mitzvos, thereby forfeiting both worlds.”

Rambam, Hichos Teshuva 9:1

By the Rambam’s assessment, no reward for a mitzvah exclusively enhances one’s life in Olam HaZeh; rather, the betterment of Olam HaZeh allows the individual to properly prepare for a more fulfilling Olam Haba. In this sense, both Kibud Av and Tzitzis qualify as mitzvos with explicit rewards. For the fulfillment of Kibud Av, Hashem promises a long and good life. The longevity itself is really only a means to the true reward, for the time allows man to perform more Mitzvos and earn a larger share of Olam Haba. Likewise, fulfillment of Tzitzis guarantees an ability to focus on fulfilling other mitzvos and not straying after other worldly desires, U’Zchartem Es Kol Mitzvos Hashem Va’Asisem Osam ViLo Sasuru Acharei Livavichem ViAcharei Eineichem.

So the rewards for Tzitzis and Kibud Av are not identical. Perhaps this explains why Hashem immediately punishes anyone who does not fulfill Kibud Av but only sometimes (namely, in bad times) punishes at those who avoid the mitzvah of Tzitzis. The enhancement of Olam HaZeh that Tzitzis promotes is dependent on the presence of adverse circumstances; when worldly desires become commonplace, then Hashem’s anger (the converse of the promised reward) shows. However, the enhancement of Olam HaZeh that Kibud Av promotes is ever-present; long life is continuously rewarded, and so non-fulfillment of the Mitzvah deserves immediate punishment.

In summary, Rashi first conjectures that Hashem’s punishement for Kibud Av is of equal severity to His punishment for such mitzvos as Tzitzis. The pasuk’s mention of “Elokim” suggests a stricter form of judgment, and so Rashi concludes that Hashem immediately takes years off one’s life for not fulfilling Kibud Av. Such is the Mizrachi’s understanding. This explanation addresses all the difficulties that emerge from Rashi’s comments, but doesn’t provide such a satisfying resolution.

I think there is a much simpler way to interpret Rashi’s words. Perhaps it is not so readily obvious that the affirmative obligation to believe Anochi Hashem incurs a punishment like other sins do. Perhaps the very existence of heavenly punishment is predicated upon man’s relationship with G-d, in which case Hashem may not care to punish those individuals who forsake the roots of their religious belief.

Rav Yosef stated [a Beraissa]: “Amad VaYimoded Eretz, Ra’ah ViYeser HaGoyim,” G-d stood up and measured the land, saw the gentiles and let them loose. What did he see? He saw that they no longer upheld the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach, therefore he let them loose [from their obligation]. Would He still reward them [for occasionally upholding these mitzvos]? If so, a sinner would earn [more] reward [than punishement]… [rather] even if they upheld [the mitzvos], they would not receive reward.

Meseches Avoda Zara, 2b

The gemara in Meseches Avoda Zara clearly states that Hashem chose to withhold reward from the Goyim instead of meting extra punishment when they abandoned their sole connection to heaven. Likewise, one might expect a Jew who does not believe in Hashem and forsakes all ties to heaven would lose all his merits but at least avoid punishment. Rather, the pasuk states “Elokim” to establish an eternal condition of judgment. No matter how far a Jew strays, G-d will be a Judge to punish transgression. But on the bright side, Elokim will also remain his trustworthy Payer of reward.