And when you will err and not perform all of these Mitzvos which Hahsem spoke to Moshe – everything which Hashem commanded you through Moshe from this day onward and through the generations – and it will be if the community acts errantly, then the entire community brings one cow as an Olah, a pleasing fragrance to Hashem… and one goat for a Chatas.
BaMidbar, 15:22-24
Rashi introduces this short parasha as exclusive guidelines for handling a Tzibur that accidentally worships Avoda Zara. Sefer VaYikra has already detailed the process of the Par Ha’Aleim Davar, the Chatas cow that is brought to atone for all other accidental communal sins, but our parasha comes specifically to remove Avoda Zara from those general guidelines. When the community is accidentally Oveid Avoda Zara, they must offer the cow as an Olah instead, and also bring a goat for a Chatas.
Rashi then declares that our pasukim discuss Avoda Zara, and not some other Aveira, for we compare Avoda Zara to all the other Mitzvos in the Torah combined; just as one who refuses to keep any Mitzvos annuls his Bris with Hashem, so too one who worships Avoda Zara annuls his Bris with Hashem. Therefore, when the pasuk describes an act as “not perfoming all of the Mitzvos,” we can assume the pasuk is referring to Avoda Zara.
Rashi’s two comments are fairly straightforward, but their order is rather perplexing. If Rashi needs to prove to us that these pasukim discuss Avoda Zara and not some other Aveira, wouldn’t we excpect Rashi to spell out this proof first, and only after comment how Avoda Zara’s Korbanos are removed from the Klal of the Par Ha’Aleim Davar? In other words, both of Rashi’s comments open with the assumption that our parasha discusses Avoda, but only his second comment questions this assumption. If his assumption can be questioned, shouldn’t Rashi do so before elaborating on some other point?
Perhaps we can answer that Rashi is indeed bothered by Chazal’s assumption that our parasha refers exclusively to accidental Avoda Zara, but before he can justify and defend this assumption, he must first establish that our parasha focuses exclusively on one Aveirah. We may have read these pasukim and considered them a new Bris of sorts. Before the Cheit HaMeraglim, only a cow was required to atone for communal sins; however, the severity of the nation’s sin in our parasha may have shifted this paradigm, and now both a cow and goat are required. Rashi asserts that no such Bris has changed; rather, the Aveira described is a very specific one, and the proof comes from the words of our pasuk.
In VaYikra, the sin of the community is described as “doing one of the Mitzvos they were commanded not to do.” This is how we normally view Aveiros. We are told to refrain from doing something, and then we accidentally do it. However, our pasuk in BaMidbar describes the sin as “not performing all the Mitzvos.” This is very backwards from our standard perception of sin. Usually not doing something is good! Clearly our pasuk must be pointing at something very specific.
Many mifarshim point to the word “Ne’estah,” the sin that “is done,” in pasuk 24, as the proof that our parasha refers to a single Aveirah, for the word is written in singular form. Because it seemingly contradicts the plural nature of “Es Kol HaMitzvos HaAleh,” Rashi resolves this inconsistency, by suggesting our parasha refers to “the Mitzvah that is like all the Mitzvos,” a single Mitzvah. But this inference is not without its difficulties. Firstly, Rashi says absolutely nothing about the word “Ne’estah;” if the focal point of his inference comes from the word, wouldn’t I expect him to say so? Furthermore, there is no inconsistency in the pasuk to begin with! We can easily read pasuk 22 “if the community violates any of all the Mitzvos Hashem commanded Moshe,” and then we’d understand quite easily why the Aveirah in pasuk 24 is written in singular form! Instead, I believe, Rashi knows our pasuk is targeting in on something very unique and specific because of the strange lashon, ViKee Sishgu ViLo Sa’asu.
What makes the pasuk’s lashon so strange is that one cannot incur a Chiuv to bring a Chatas unless he actively violates an Aveirah. Even if one accidentally thinks to worship Avoda Zara (not realizing the intended action is Avoda Zara, for instance), as bad a thought as it might be, one would not give a Chatas until he has actually performed the intended action.
The Levush HaOrah explains that Rashi is not trying to attribute any action to the words “ViLo Sa’asu Es Kol HaMitzvos Ha’Aleh Asher Diber Hashem El Moshe” altogether; instead, Rashi is saying that one who violates the particular Mitzvah described in our parasha cannot practically perform all the other Mitzvos. And what are those other Mitzvos? Everything which Hashem spoke to Moshe (with the exception of the two Mitzvos we heard from Hashem ourselves, Anochi Hashem, and Lo Yiheyeh, which we can always choose to perform). But without submitting to exclusive existence of Hashem, there is no point in performing any other Mitzvah, for to whom would we perform the Mitzvah? Our Avoda and Shmiras Mitzvos can only be worth anything if we direct it properly.
Therefore, our pasuk reads, ViKi Sishgu, when we make a mistake and accidentally think to worship other gods, then ViLo Sa’asu, it is as if all the Avoda we perform is for naught, for it is not directed towards HaKadosh Baruch Hu anymore. All that Moshe commands is for naught, for we cannot act upon it constructively, and all the words of the later Nivi’im are for naught as well, for the very same reasons. Only in pasuk 24 do we begin to describe the act of worshiping Avoda Zara, the act that incurs the Chiuv Chatas. But unlike any of the other accidental communal sins, we must also give an Olah to mend our separation from HaKadosh Baruch Hu and His Avoda at large, and we must bring the Olah first.
It now becomes clear exactly how Rashi knows our parasha refers to Avoda Zara and not anything else. And it becomes clear that we are not merely or arbitrarily choosing any “Mitzvah that equals all the other Mitzvos,” for if that were the case, I could have chosen Shabbos:
“Why does the parasha of the Mikosheish border that of Avoda Zara? To tell [us] that one who violates Shabbos is likened to an idol worshiper, for Shabbos is equal to all the Mitzvos as well.”
Rashi, BaMidbar 15:41
Astoudingly, there are other Mitzvos that Rashi blatantly asserts are equal to all the other Mitzvos, and in this very same parasha no less! How then does Rashi know that we do not bring that cow and the goat for Chillul Shabbos as well? Clearly, there is a difference between the violation of Shabbos and that of Avoda Zara. When one worships other gods, he denies the very existence of G-d as a unique source. But when one violates Shabbos, he only denies the actions of G-d, the fact that he rested on the 7th day. Such a distinction is drawn by Rashi in Mesechet Chulin (5a), and it helps us understand why one who violates Shabbos may be considered a Kofer BaHashem, but his other Avodos can still be worth something, for he has not denied Hashem’s existence. The Mitzvos of the idol worshiper, on the other hand, lack all direction and meaningfulness, and so he is exclusively the one who “does not do all the Mitzvos” when he falls out of line.
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