Parashat Behar

When the Torah forbids one to lend to his fellow Jew with interest, the pasuk uses both the words Neshech and Tarbis? Why multiple words for a single offense? Rashi answers that the Torah’s intent was to attach two separate Aveiros to this single offense. The Gur Aryeh, attempting to clarify Rashi’s comments, explains that there are two separate aspects to the Aveirah of Neshech ViTarbis. On one side, the borrower is losing money that is rightfully his; this we call Neshech, for it is comparable to the lender taking a bite out of the borrower as a snake might. On the other side of the transaction, the lender is unjustly gaining money; this we call Ribbis, from the shoresh of Rav or Harbei.

But this answer simply does not suffice. Since when does the Torah punish a man for making money?! Does one transgress two separate Aveiros any time he steals? In reality, the gaining of money is just a facet of the general Aveirah. Perhaps a person who steals from another without any personal gain is even more despicable than a person who steals and profits; perhaps he deserves an extra Aveirah! So what makes Neshech any different that the Gur Aryeh could ever fathom Chazal having added an Aveirah for profiting?

The Kli Yakar takes an interesting approach to the Aveirah of Ribbis that may help us understand the Gur Aryeh’s reasoning. The Kli Yakar suggests that the parasha of Ribbis emphasizes the need for Bitachon in Hashem, that when one charges interest to another Jew, he denies his belief that Hashem will support him when he performs Mitzvos properly. Therefore, the pasuk in Parashat Ki Teitzei allows us to charge interest to Goyim because of their lack of integrity to repay their loans. Since we must have full Bitachon in Hashem in order to lend money to a Goi altogether and expect him to pay it back, it does not hamper our Bitachon by any means to expect Goyim to return loans with interest.

Yet the Kli Yakar’s answer still does not suffice, for Rashi also takes note of our pasuk’s continuation, ViYareisa MeiElokecha, and lists two cases that this clause comes to include into the prohibition of Neshech ViTarbis. One of these scenarios is a situation where one lends money to a Goi in order for the Goi to lend and charge interest to a Jew; then the Jew will pay a large sum of interest to the Goi and the Goi will return a cut of this money to the original lender. It seems ViYareisa MeiElokecha is stated to teach the Jew that the lures of charging interest are incredibly strong, so don’t try to find a way to commit these Aveiros without being caught by the victimized Jewish borrower. By the Kli Yakar’s approach, the original lender should be allowed to do this; by no means does it transgress the Issur of Ribbis because there is no guarantee that the Goi will ever return a cent of his earnings; as long as the Jew hands his money to the Goi, he maintains ful Bitachon in Hashem, regardless of what the Goi does with the money. But Rashi somehow considers this scenario to be no different than a standard case of Neshech. How?

A closer look at Rashi suggests that this scenario was not emphasized because of the lender’s stealthy and covert fashion. Rashi’s first scenario, his first situation for which the pasuk needs to state ViYareisa MeiElokecha, is nothing more than the standard case of Neshech! There’s certainly no stealth in such a case, and yet Rashi seems to be equating these two scenarios – a regular loan with interest and a loan handled through a Non-Jewish third party – as if they are no different from each other, as if one’s fear of G-d will equally prevent him from transgressing these prohibitions. How can this be?

Perhaps Rashi’s take on the Issur of Ribbis is based on a broader analysis of these pasukim. If we look back at pasuk 35, we see that the Aveiros of Nesech and Ribbis are attached to a more general Mitzvah, namely Tzedakah. The pasuk says to help out any Jewish paupers and straighten their financial status before they decline; therefore, it is a Mitzvah to lend this money to the Jew, and one would expect Hashem to repay him for his troubles. But if a lender ever charges interest to a Jew, then he is no longer receiving his Schar from Hashem but rather from his friend. He is turning his opportunity for a Mitzvah into an opportunity for business. His rejection of Hashem’s Mitzvah and his rejection of the Schar for the Mitzvah are the reasons for the added Lav. An outright theif only commits one Aveirah, but a person who charges interest doesn’t only steal from his borrower; he also steals from himself the opportunity to properly perform a Mitzvah.

It is therefore clear why the prohibition on interest does not forbid one from lending to a Goi; there is no Mitzvah to lend money to poor Goyim in the first place. However, one who lends money to a Goi in order for the Goi to charge interest to a needy Jew is indeed no different than a person who outright lends the money to his fellow Jew with interest. Both are offered a Mitzvah, and both reject the Mitzah in return for a business opportunity. This is why the pasuk must emphasize ViYereissa MeiElokecha in regard to even the basic transgression, for a person who does not fear G-d’s Mitzvos and simply tries to accomplish them at his own convenience will see absolutely no problem with Neshech ViTarbis. It is only the person who fully fears Hashem and fully understands the value of a Mitzvah that will not succumb to this ever-alluring Aveirah.

Good Shabbos.