Parashat Yisro

In his introductory comments to Ma’amad Har Sinai, Rashi questions whether one could be punished for violating the Aseres HaDibros. “Since there are [commandments] in the Torah for which man receives reward [for fulfilling these commandments] and is not punished for not [fulfilling them],” Rashi surmises, “one might think the same of the Aseres HaDibros.” Rashi quashes this supposition with a quote from the Mechilta:

VaYidabeir Elokim. [Why Elokim and not Hashem?] The name Elokim invariably refers to [His nature as a] Judge to punish [for transgression] and [as a] trustworthy Payer of reward.

Mechilta, Yisro, Parasha 4

The Mechilta’s function is readily obvious; G-d presents Himself at the start of Mattan Torah as the awesome Being capable of meting fair punishment and reward. Rashi builds off this fundamental premise and suggests that its application to the Aseres HaDirbos in particular is itself a chiddush.

The Nachalas Ya’akov wonders, though, how much of a chiddush Rashi teaches us here. Presumably, Rashi admits that one could never escape the consequences of violating a Mitzvas Lo Sa’aseih, but there exist some Mitzvos Assei for which he cannot be punished. This leaves three Mitzvos within the Aseres HaDibros: Anochi Hashem; Shabbos; and Kibud Av VaAim. Shabbos is both a Mitzvas Assei and Lo Sa’asei (Lo Sa’aseh Kol Milacha), and belief in Hashem is so central to Jewish thought, it is impossible to think one could deny Hashem’s presence in the world and not deserve punishment.

By default, the mitzvah of Kibud Av Va’aim is the single mitzvah within the Aseres HaDibros that theoretically can only fulfilled but never violated. Hashem therefore introduces Himself as Elokim to emphasize how an avoidance of Kibud Av is itself a sin and worthy of punishment. Rashi himself supports this position elsewhere:

LiMa’an Ya’arichun Yamecha, so that you shall live long. If you honor [them,] your years will be lengthened, but if not, they will be shortened, for the words of Torah are abbreviated, and affirmative [commandments] imply prohibitive [commandments], and prohibitive [commandments] imply affirmative [commandments].

Rashi, Shemos 20:12

The Nachalas Ya’akov takes issue with this premise as a whole, though, for Chazal cite an account that suggests exactly the opposite:

Rami Bar Tamri went up to [the Babylonian city of] Sura… and approached Rav Chisda… He saw a man who would not honor his father or mother, so he attempted to beat [the man. Rav Chisda saw this and] said, “leave him, for all mitzvos with explicit rewards [such as Kibud Av] the human courts may not enforce.”

Meseches Chulin, 110a-110b

Evidently, the affirmative duty of Kibud Av implies no such converse prohibition. Rashi himself comments, “the explicit statement of reward [in the pasuk] suggests that its [only] punishment is [that one] not receive this reward.” How then can Rashi claim that Hashem will shorten one’s life for not fulfilling Kibud Av?

The Nachalas Ya’akov proposes an answer to his own question. Perhaps the human courts do not punish for the avoidance of Kibud Av, but the heavenly courts do. In other words, Rav Chisda stopped Rami bar Tamri from beating the man because the violation of Kibud Av is a matter left for Shamayim to judge. From the court’s perspective, the only consequence of Kibud Av is reward for its fulfillment, but Hashem will later judge each individual on the basis of his regard for the fulfillment of Mitzvos in general.

Another question emerges. For what mitzvos does Hashem refuse to punish? The Nachalas Ya’akov suggests such mitzvos as Tzitzis or Ma’aser, mitzvos that can be circumvented through cunning tricks. For instance, one must only give a tenth of the produce that enters through the door to his house, so if he brings it through the window, he can avoid the mitzvah of Ma’aser. Likewise, one must put Tzitzis on a four-cornered garment, but if his garment is round, he has no obligation whatsoever.

The Nachalas Ya’akov’s stance, however, creates a difficulty. The standard individual has parents and thereby immediately incurs the obligation to honor those parents. Logically, Hashem would not shorten the life of an orphan simply because he cannot fulfill Kibud Av. But those mitzvos for which Hashem doesn’t punish are never actually violated to begin with because the individual never incurs an obligation altogether. How then can Rashi compare Hashem’s unwillingness to punish individuals who avoid a mitzvah to Hashem’s approach regarding the actual transgression of Kibud Av?

The gemara in Meseches Menachos (41a) implies that the blatant avoidance of a mitzvah is itself a sin. The gemara relates an encounter between Ketiya and an angel. The angel asks Ketiya why he isn’t wearing Tzitzis on his garment. Although Ketiya wore a two cornered garment, and thereby not obligated in the mitzvah, the angel expresses displeasure with his lack of desire to fulfill the mitzvah. “Would I be punished for [not wearing] Tzitzis?” Ketiya asks, and the malach replies, “When G-d is angry.” Tosafos, in Meseches Arachin (2b), comments on the account. According to Tosafos, in Ketiya’s time, a standard garment had four corners; therefore, Ketiya’s choice to wear a two-cornered garment was itself a blatant refusal to incur the obligation of Tzitzis. Nowadays, however, garments commonly come without four distinct corners, and one who wears a “two-cornered garment” is not necessarily guilty of punishment like Ketiya.

The fact that an angel confronts Ketiya regarding his sin itself suggests that no person bothered Ketiya about his mistake. Perhaps this is because Tzitzis whose reward is explicitly recorded in the Torah. But what might that reward be?

“You can explain all blessing and curses [in the Torah] in this manner: If you serve G-d in happiness… you will distance yourself from the curses and leave yourself free to study the Torah so you will merit Olam Haba, and both your lives [in this world and the world to come] will be good…and if you forsake Hashem and sin… you will bring upon the curses until your lives are filled with panic and fear and you will have no heart with which to perform the mitzvos, thereby forfeiting both worlds.”

Rambam, Hichos Teshuva 9:1

By the Rambam’s assessment, no reward for a mitzvah exclusively enhances one’s life in Olam HaZeh; rather, the betterment of Olam HaZeh allows the individual to properly prepare for a more fulfilling Olam Haba. In this sense, both Kibud Av and Tzitzis qualify as mitzvos with explicit rewards. For the fulfillment of Kibud Av, Hashem promises a long and good life. The longevity itself is really only a means to the true reward, for the time allows man to perform more Mitzvos and earn a larger share of Olam Haba. Likewise, fulfillment of Tzitzis guarantees an ability to focus on fulfilling other mitzvos and not straying after other worldly desires, U’Zchartem Es Kol Mitzvos Hashem Va’Asisem Osam ViLo Sasuru Acharei Livavichem ViAcharei Eineichem.

So the rewards for Tzitzis and Kibud Av are not identical. Perhaps this explains why Hashem immediately punishes anyone who does not fulfill Kibud Av but only sometimes (namely, in bad times) punishes at those who avoid the mitzvah of Tzitzis. The enhancement of Olam HaZeh that Tzitzis promotes is dependent on the presence of adverse circumstances; when worldly desires become commonplace, then Hashem’s anger (the converse of the promised reward) shows. However, the enhancement of Olam HaZeh that Kibud Av promotes is ever-present; long life is continuously rewarded, and so non-fulfillment of the Mitzvah deserves immediate punishment.

In summary, Rashi first conjectures that Hashem’s punishement for Kibud Av is of equal severity to His punishment for such mitzvos as Tzitzis. The pasuk’s mention of “Elokim” suggests a stricter form of judgment, and so Rashi concludes that Hashem immediately takes years off one’s life for not fulfilling Kibud Av. Such is the Mizrachi’s understanding. This explanation addresses all the difficulties that emerge from Rashi’s comments, but doesn’t provide such a satisfying resolution.

I think there is a much simpler way to interpret Rashi’s words. Perhaps it is not so readily obvious that the affirmative obligation to believe Anochi Hashem incurs a punishment like other sins do. Perhaps the very existence of heavenly punishment is predicated upon man’s relationship with G-d, in which case Hashem may not care to punish those individuals who forsake the roots of their religious belief.

Rav Yosef stated [a Beraissa]: “Amad VaYimoded Eretz, Ra’ah ViYeser HaGoyim,” G-d stood up and measured the land, saw the gentiles and let them loose. What did he see? He saw that they no longer upheld the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach, therefore he let them loose [from their obligation]. Would He still reward them [for occasionally upholding these mitzvos]? If so, a sinner would earn [more] reward [than punishement]… [rather] even if they upheld [the mitzvos], they would not receive reward.

Meseches Avoda Zara, 2b

The gemara in Meseches Avoda Zara clearly states that Hashem chose to withhold reward from the Goyim instead of meting extra punishment when they abandoned their sole connection to heaven. Likewise, one might expect a Jew who does not believe in Hashem and forsakes all ties to heaven would lose all his merits but at least avoid punishment. Rather, the pasuk states “Elokim” to establish an eternal condition of judgment. No matter how far a Jew strays, G-d will be a Judge to punish transgression. But on the bright side, Elokim will also remain his trustworthy Payer of reward.

Parashat BiShalach

The pasuk is a clear contradiction of itself.

“VaYa’asu Kain Bnei Yisrael VaYilkitu HaMarbeh ViHaMamit”

Shemos, 16:17

If Moshe commands each member of the nation to gather exactly an Omer of Man, how the pasuk acknowledge both that they “did so” and that some took more and some took less? Rashi offers a weird explanation:

“HaMarbeh ViHaMamit,” some took a lot and some took a little, and when they came to their houses, they measured their gatherings… those who gathered more did not have more than an Omer per person, and those who measured less did not have less than an Omer per person, and this was a great miracle done through [the Man].

Rashi, Shemos 16:17

There are two readily apparent ways to understand the phrase VaYa’asu Kain according to Rashi. It could refer to the simple fact that the people ended up with exactly what Moshe commanded them to gather, regardless of whether they tried to fulfill this objective or not. It could refer to the effort they put into gathering the proper amount, although they could not measure precisely how much they had gathered until they came home. The Mizrachi suggests the former approach while the Nachalas Ya’akov proposes the latter.

However, both approaches fail to define VaYa’as Kain as it is used in every other context, as the intentional fulfillment of a given objective. It is also strange that Rashi should refer to “those who gathered more” and “those who gathered less.” These terms suggest that some people would consistently gather too much and some would consistently gather too little. Even if an individual consistently overestimated or underestimated, should Rashi really go out of his way to indicate this? Rather, it would be simpler to write, “if one took a lot… or if he a little.”

Rashi also sounds certain that the people did not measure their gatherings until they came home, however, there is no explicit indication in the pasuk. In fact, had Rashi claimed that each person brought a scale to the site of Man gathering, the pasukim would have made much more sense! First the people would gather an approximate amount, then they would put it on the scale, then they would add or remove some Man to bring their gatherings to the proper measure. No miracle would be necessary, and most importantly, the people would conscientiously fulfill Hashem’s command!

Perhaps Rashi is simultaneously addressing another contradiction embedded within these pasukim. Moshe Rabbeinu tells the people to collect “Eesh Lifi Achlo,” each man by the measure of his [daily] food [portions]. This phrase suggests that each man should first decide how much he normally eats in a given day, and should then collect exactly this much. However, Moshe immediately declares “Omer LaGulgoles,” one Omer per person. This phrase states quite clearly that no matter how large or small a person’s hunger, he should collect exactly an Omer.

To resolve this contradiction, Rashi proposes that each man consistently collected “Lifi Achlo,” a quantity relative to his appetite. A large person would always collect more than an Omer and a small person would always collect less than an Omer. However, the food was not of this world and it did not satiate man by a physical means. (In Parashat Chukas, Rashi explains Man is called Lechem HaKilukal, accursed bread, because it did not fill men’s stomachs. This was a favor to Klal Yisrael, for they never needed a bathroom, but the nation did not express due gratitude.) Therefore, when they returned home to measure their gatherings, they discovered their portions were all the same, for small and large men each required equal doses of spiritual satiation.

Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai said, “[The] Torah was given only to Man eaters.”

Midrash Tanchuma, BiShalach, 20

Through the dual measuring procedures of Man gathering, first by one’s hunger and after by his scale, Hashem teaches Klal Yisrael a valuable lesson. Each man’s physical hunger does not parallel his spiritual hunger, and a single Torah can satisfy any individual. Moreover, instead of commanding outright that each man collect an Omer, Hashem provided the necessary steps for each man to discover this lesson on his own. In this manner, the Man aided Klal Yisrael towards a Kabalas HaTorah built upon the willingness to “Na’aseh ViNishma,” to not only blindly fulfill the Torah’s objectives, but to even acknowledge that the Jewish nation will someday understand whatever they are told to do.

Parashat Bo

Parashat Bo lists the victims of Makas Bechoros three times:

1) (11:5) Here, Moshe warns Paroh of the Makah. PREDICTION

2) (12:12) Here, Hashem describes the Makah to Moshe DESCRIPTION

3) (12:29) Here, Hashem executes the Makah. EXECUTION

To keep things clear, let’s refer to these three accounts as the Prediction, the Description, and the Execution respectively. The given lists of victims change slightly from one account to the next, as do the reasons Rashi provides for why each type of person, animal, or object was smitten.

For instance, in the Prediction, Rashi explains that Hashem killed all the Bechor animals because the Mitzrim worshiped them. Later, in the Description, the pasuk lists “MeiAdam Vi’Ad Beheimah,” prompting Rashi to explain that the people were struck first because they sinned first. Not only do these two explanations differ from one another, but they emerge from contrasting premises. The first reasoning suggests that the animals never sinned but instead were merely the objects of Mitzrayim’s transgression, whereas the notion that Hashem struck the people first because they sinned first suggests exactly the opposite.

Rashi’s peirush here bears many difficulties of this sort, with one bold exception. In the opening to the Prediction, Rashi comments that Hashem killed the captives’ firstborn (Bechor HaShvi) in order “Shelo Yomeru Yerasam Tavah Elbonam,” so they should not claim that their god (as opposed to Hashem) sought retribution for their slavery (and nto in response to the Jews’ slavery). As expected, Rashi’s explanation in the Prediction does not match up with his explanation in the Execution, where he claims that Hashem killed the Bechor HaShvi “SheHayu Shmeicim LiEidam Shel Yisrael,” for they were delighted with the destruction of the Jewish nation. At least these two explanations can coexist. (One should also note that Rashi brings both explanations by the Execution.) What is inexplicable about Rashi’s comments by the Prediction, however, is that the pasuk never mentions the Bechor HaShvi altogether.

The Gur Aryeh connects Rashi’s out-of-place comment to his remark in the previous pasuk. In pasuk 4, Moshe elected to say KaChatos instead of BaChatzos to Paroh and his magicians so that they not accuse him of lying about the precise time of the makah (should their calculations of midnight be a little mistaken). In case one has any concerns that the Mitzrim will accuse Moshe of lying because he never mentioned that Hashem would strike the Bechor HaShvi, the Gur Aryeh explains, Rashi comments that the Bechor HaShvi died simply to quash the captives’ potential claim that their god and not Hashem brought about the makah, but not to affect the Mitzrim’s perspective of their plight. In truth, Moshe Rabbeinu did not bother to mention the death of the Bechor HaShvi to Paroh, for Paroh could care less about the wellbeing of a few measly captives.

The Gur Aryeh’s claim resolves the contradiction between Rashi’s reasons for the Bechor Beheimah’s death. The Prediction stated to Paroh only listed those victims Paroh cared about. Moshe informed Paroh that his animals, the ones he deified and concerned himself with, would die. In truth, though, not only Paroh’s deified animals but every animal that sinned also died, as Hashem described in His Description of the makah. Rashi therefore notes in the Description that man precedes animal in the pasuk because the men sinned first (and presumably influenced the animals, as Rashi describes occurred in the Dor HaMabul).

But then why does Hashem list the wooden and metal gods of Mitzrayim as victims of the Makah in the Description but not in the Prediction? By the Gur Aryeh’s understanding, Moshe should inform Paroh that his idols will be destroyed, for Paroh surely cared about his idols.

The Levush HaOrah uncovers a far more critical flaw within the Gur Aryeh’s position. The Gur Aryeh somehow reasons that the Mitzrim would not be concerned with the death of the Bechor HaShvi, yet they would be so overly concerned with proving Moshe a liar that if the makah occurred a few minutes after chatzos they would immediately jump to false conclusions.

In a way, the strongest refutation to the Gur Aryeh’s explanation comes from Rashi himself:

And the Mitzrim pressed the Jews to hurry [preparations] to be sent [by Paroh] from the land [for three days] for they said “we are all going to die.”

They said, “It is not as Moshe decreed, for he said all firstborns would die, and yet even commoners perished, five or ten from a single household!”

Rashi, Shemos 12:33

Rashi himself acknowledges that the Mitzrim believed Moshe’s prediction was incorrect! It seems all of Moshe’s work to avoid this predicament is for naught. The Tzeida LaDerech explains that the Mitzrim were all suspect of licentiousness, and therefore when they came to their senses and accepted their wives were adulteresses, they realized that Moshe was indeed not a liar. In a similar vain, the Maharshal explains that the Mitzrim’s wives confessed to adultery and so everyone soon realized Moshe spoke the truth.

But these answers are not totally satisfying for two reasons: 1) The people still do accuse Moshe of having lied, and there is no indication that their first impression of Moshe’s prediction was overwritten by their subsequent understanding of his words. 2) When Rashi discusses the lewdness of Mitzrayim and the consequent mass execution of firstborns (see 12:30), he comments “five sons for every woman, each the firstborn of his respective father.” Indeed the Mechilta uses this same number when describing how the Mitzrim exclaimed “we are all going to die.” Yet Rashi here conveniently adds the number “ten” to his comments, as if to suggest that more than the given five firstborns died.

Indeed, it would be silly to think that Hashem could not kill an Egyptian deserving on death just because that Egyptian was not a firstborn. Hashem asks the Jews to remain in their homes, lest the Mashchis should attack them, and Rashi explains that Hashem let many harmful forces out into the streets of Mitzrayim that night. Without question, many commoner Mitzrim died that night, and so Moshe indeed was a “liar.”

The Gur Aryeh’s, Tzeidah LaDerech’s and Maharshal’s understanding of Moshe’s need to speak the “truth” all focus around an assumption that the occurrence of an event Moshe does not predict (i.e. the deaths of captives and commoners) is comparable to the non-occurrence of a predicted event (i.e. Makas Bechoros at precisely midnight). However, this is not necessarily so. Moshe can only be proven a liar if something he predicts never comes true, but Moshe can always argue that he never bothered to mention how commoners and firstborns of captives would also die for these occurrences were of little importance within the grand scheme of HaKadosh Baruch Hu’s plans.

The Levush HaOrah takes this issue a step further. On the contrary, he writes, it is Hashem’s very nature to trip up the Goyim and leave them room for error, as He does by suggesting Na’aseh Adam (Beraishis 1:26). Hashem in fact is willing to lie for the sake of Shalom, as He does when relaying Sarah’s words to Avraham (VaAni Zakanti, Beraishis 18:13)! Why then would Moshe even concern himself with being thought of as a liar?

The Levush HaOrah maintains that Rashi is in fact bothered by this very issue. The Mechilta clearly expresses Moshe’s concern not to be thought of as a liar, but does not express the reason for this concern (in light of Hashem’s willingness to lie in some cases). However, if the very purpose of the Makos in Mitzrayim is LiMa’an Yaidi’u Ki Ani Hashem BiKerev Ha’Aretz, in order that the Mitzrim know and understand that Hashem is present in the land and the force behind these plagues, then Moshe has very good reason to state KaChatzos instead of BaChatzos, lest some Mitzrim fail to acknowledge Hashem’s presence. Rashi therefore notes how Hashem was compelled to kill the Bechor Shvi, even though their deaths were not mentioned in Moshe’s Prediction, because their deaths nonetheless helped the Mitzrim acknowledge Hashem’s hand in the makah, to the exclusion of the captives’ god.

Interestingly, Rashi comments by the Execution that the Bechor Shvi was struck SheLo Yomeru Yerasainu Hava’a Puraniyos Zu, so that they should not say “our god brought these tragedies [upon the Mitzrim].” Rashi subtly changes the word Yerasem by the Prediction to Yerasainu by the Execution, suggesting that these are indeed two different reasons for the Bechor Shvi’s death. From one angle, Hashem did not want the captives themselves to acknowledge their god as the enforcer of the makah, as is suggested by the word Yerasainu (our god). Additionally, Hashem did not want the Mitzrim drawing any such conclusion, as is suggested by the word Yerasam (their god, our captives’ god).

It is evident then that Hashem’s concern by stating KaChatzos does not involve any such calculation between what is true and what is false. Rather, all that concerns Hashem is whether the Mitzrim will be capable of acknowledging Him and His presence in Mitzrayim. Nonetheless, there is no need for Moshe to explicitly state within the Prediciton that the Bechor of the Shvi wil die, just like there is no need for him to state that the idols will rot and melt. The Mitzrim will see this in due time and draw the correct and intended conclusions whether they were precisely warned or not.

In fact, it worked to Moshe’s advantage to leave some facts out of his Prediction in order to later frighten the Mitzrim into thinking “we are all going to die.” Moshe Rabbeinu mentions Bechor Paroh and Bechor Shifcha, but then even the Bechor Shvi dies. Likewise, Moshe Rabbeinu mentions Bechor Beheima, but then even the other deities are destroyed. Moshe’s words truly are calculating within his Prediction of Makas Bechoros, but not in the manner one normally imagines.