Purim '06

The story of Purim, the saga chronicled in the Megilas Esther, is often remembered as a clear and present highpoint along the tumultuous history of Yahadut, and for good reason. A sudden twist of fortune miraculously transforms the (seemingly) inevitable genocide of the Jewish nation into their most lopsided victory of all time. The nation acquires Achashveirosh’s trust and their enemies’ fear; soon, the masses convert (Esther 8:17) and Mordechai is appointed viceroy (10:3). What spurred such a remarkable upset? As the pasukim in Sefer Devarim teach us, our relationship with the Goyim is most prevalently dependant upon our relationship with HaKadosh Baruch Hu and our performance of His commandments:

And you shall guard and keep [Hashem’s Torah], for your adherence to all these Chukim will be your [source of] wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the Goyim, and they will say “What a wise and understanding nation these people are!”

Devarim 4:6

The pasuk describes the Mitzvos we perform as the very source of our wisdom. In essence, the Jewish Code of Law serves as a beacon of rationality and sensibility to the other nations; they see our behavior and follow our lead. But even more, the commandments we keep make sense to the Goyim, and so we earn the recognition as an intellectually superior nation, even if Hashem – and not we – is the intellectual source behind our laws.

And yet, at times, Mitzvos can function totally contrary to human rationale. In fact, the very concept of a Chok is that it be fulfilled without being understood, that it be followed for no greater reason than that Hashem commanded so! What then does the pasuk mean? Does our adherence to the Chukim serve as the source of our wisdom? The blind observance of Chukim may not in anyway undermine our potential wisdom, but they in no way enhance our intellectual prowess! How could the Goyim ever perceive our intellectual superiority through the analysis of our Chukim?!

In fact, the story of the Megilah suggests that our observance of the Chukim will strike exactly the opposite reaction! The Gemara in Meseches Megilah (13a) notes that when Haman HaRashah rose to power and forced all the King’s servants to bow to him, he placed a small idol against his chest so that each servant’s prostration would be directed not only at him, but also at his idol. Mordechai, therefore, refused to bow and thus worship Haman’s idol, a clear fulfillment of Hashem’s command, Lo Yihiyeh. But instead of Mordechai’s observance of the Mitzvah predicating Haman’s respect and reverence, his insurrection only angered and insulted Haman, much as we would expect. Granted, Mordechai’s fulfillment of the Mitzvos eventually resulted in the Jewish nation’s victory, but doesn’t the pasuk in Devarim ensure a much smoother road to greatness and respect?

Perhaps we could make more sense of this pasuk if we could come to a better understanding of the Chachmah that the other nations recognize in us. What is Chachmah?

Marbeh Yeshiva, Marbeh Chachmah, one who increases his sitting [in Torah study] increases his knowledge.

Pirkei Avos, 2:7

We often think of Chachmah as the accumulation of knowledge, or its intelligent application, both traits expressed by Shlomo HaMelech (in his judgment of the two women and their baby) the day Hashem proclaimed him the greatest Chacham ViNavon in history (see Malachim I, 3:12). Let’s see if this definition accords with Chazal’s understanding of the term. The shoresh ‘Chacham’ appears twice in the Megilah.

1) (1:13)When Queen Vashti enrages her husband Achashveirosh by refusing to parade in front of his party’s guests, Achashveirosh sends for his advisors, the Chachamim Yodei Ha’Itim. The gemara (Megilah 12b) identifies these scholars as the Rabbanan (in similar vein, the Midrash Esther Rabbah identifies them as the leaders of Shevet Yissachar). The gemara continues that Achashveirosh consulted them as to how best to deal with his wife’s insubordination, but the scholars were uncertain. They conferred, “if we tell him to kill her, then he will eventually calm down and then seek to kill us for catering to his fury. If we tell him to let her live, then we will indirectly cause the embarrassment of the king and surely be put to death!” The scholars therefore reasoned to Achashveirsoh that their powers of wisdom had ceased since the beginning of their exile, and so Achashveirosh was forced to call in the wise men of Amon and Moav instead: Karshina; Sheisar; Admasa; and so on. It is rather ironic that these Rabbanan be identified as Chachamim within the pasuk, for their very argument to the King was that they were ignorant. Indecision may have been the appropriate plan of action, but does that make it the manifestation of Chachamah?

2) (6:13) After Haman leads Mordechai around Shushan on the King’s horse, he returns home and tells his wife and friends about his recent misfortune, to which they respond “If Mordechai is from the seed of the Yihudim, then your ultimate downfall has begun, and there is no way to overcome him.” Chazal, again in the gemara (Megilah 16a), take note of the word Chachamav when Haman’s friends respond to him. In all other dialogues, the term Ohavav is used, but here the friends are termed scholars. Rabbi Yochanan explains: Anyone who says a scholarly thing – even [a scoundrel] from the other nations – is credited a Chacham. These scholars said to Haman, “if Mordechai is a descendant of either Yehuda’s or Yoseif’s, then you will surely fall to him [for each Sheivet was promised victory against their respective enemies], but if he is from another tribe, then you will ultimately prevail.”

Again it seems odd that Rabbi Yochanan (and the Megilah for that matter) identify this as a statement of Chachmah, for here we see a great deal of uncertainty within Haman’s friends’ prediction. We also see a gap in their knowledge, for they do not know Mordechai’s lineage. And yet this is their wisest advice, and not Zeresh’s suggestion to build a gallows for Mordechai (5:14), which The Targum identifies as a most complex and detailed proposal:

“You can’t kill Mordechai with a sword, for [Moshe] already survived Paroh’s executioner. And King Menashe once survived a fatal snakebite. And stoning won’t work, for that’s how Dovid killed Golias. And Daniel survived the lion’s pit, and Chananya Misha’el and Azaria all survived the furnace. And you can’t exile Mordecahi to the desert, since the Bnei Yisrael thrived there en route to Eretz Yisrael. And Yoseif survived jail. And Yitzchak survived the knife [at the Akeidah]. What else can we do but hang him... Tomorrow, inform the King that Mordechai refuses to bow down to you, as Achashveirosh himself commanded (see 3:2), and therefore Mordechai is deserving of death for disobeying the King’s orders.”

Targum, Megilas Esther 5:14

Zeresh shows a superior command of Jewish history, a firm grasp of the methods of execution, and even a working knowledge of politics. How could this not be categorized Chachmah?!

All things considered, Zeresh’s advise is so sharp and so well contrived, it’s hard to believe how badly it backfired! Why was Haman ultimately hanged and not Mordechai? Haman may have plotted behind the King’s back and even ‘fallen’ on top of the Queen, but he never directly violated the law of the land; Mordechai, on the other hand, blatantly subverted the King’s decree to bow to Haman!

The Malbim provides a satisfying explanation. Haman too defied a royal edict, and the Malbim appropriately draws the proof from Charvona’s quip (7:9), the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. All the while Haman was riding Mordechai around Shushan, proclaiming “So shall be done to the man in the King’s liking,” there was a gallows erected with Mordechai’s name on it. Everyone who would see the gallows would know Mordechai was slated for hanging later that afternoon, and Mordechai wouldn’t look so great in the populous’ eyes, contrary to Achashveriosh’s wishes. Therefore, Haman’s construction of the gallows undermined the very orders the King handed him, and so he too was guilty of subverting a royal decree.

One might expect Charvona’s mention of the tree to remind Achashverosh that even Mordechai was, in truth, deserving of death. But instead, it only reminded Achashveirosh of Haman’s upstart attitude, his tendency to act on a whim without first consulting the higher authorities.

“VaYomeir Memuchan.” (1:16) Rav Kehana says: From here we see that upstart underlings [since Haman’s nickname, Memuchan, came last in the list of Paroh’s advisors] impatiently jump to the head [for Memuchan was the first to offer advice].

Meseches Megilah, 12b

The gemara asks, “why was Haman nicknamed Memuchan?” and answers, “because he was Muchan LiPuraniyos, prepared for woe.” From Haman’s very outset, the Megilah paints him a sloppy, haphazard, and assuming officer, always eager to act without conferring or consulting. Just as he jumps to deal with Achashveirosh’s marital and political issues, he later builds the gallows and then goes to inform the King of Mordechai’s disobedience. It is his presumptuous and arrogant tendencies that ultimately do him in, and it was Zeresh’s proposal to first make the tree (overnight) and then go inform the King (in the morning) so that he could arrive at Esther’s party at mental ease, instead of troubling himself to construct Mordechai’s gallows. Amazingly, the fatal flaw in Zeresh’s advice was her lack of uncertainty.

The more and more we analyze the scenarios of the Megilah, the more and more apparent it becomes that Chachmah is dependant not on one’s breadth of knowledge, but rather upon one’s recognition of what he doesn’t know.

But we still haven’t addressed any of our most pertinent questions. We can pretend to identify Chukim as the source of Chachmah, for we follow Chukim despite not understanding their benefits, and we thereby come to recognition of what we don’t know. But why should such behavior earn us respect in the Goyim’s eyes? And if Mordechai did possess this level of Chachmah, for he ultimately earns the respect of all the nations, then why didn’t he gain Haman’s respect too?

Looking again at the subtleties within Charvona’s appeal, we find a peculiar description of Mordechai. He is, again according to the Malbim, Asher Dibeir Tov Al HaMelech, the one who speaks good regarding the King (as opposed to the GR”A’s understanding of these words, that they refer to Haman’s intent to speak good, to pass the idea across to the King that morning). In other words, the Malbim clarifies, Mordechai should be favored because of his success as the King’s guardian. A few years back, Mordechai saved Achashveirosh from assassination at the hands of Bigsan and Seresh. Therefore, Achashveirosh can interpret Moerdechai’s refusal to stand and bow to Haman as an expression of his concern for the King’s life. Mordechai’s job, his orders from the King, was to guard the palace, to be Yosheiv BiSha’ar HaMelech, and so he couldn’t be expected to fulfill both ends of contradictory orders. Moreso, Mordechai chose well to put the King’s life in higher priority than Haman’s Kavod. All in all Mordechai’s actions, from Achashveirosh’s perspective, retain a notable level of consistency, and for that Mordechai is not only spared, but respected.

Such respect would be hard to earn from Haman, for Haman knew exactly why Mordechai refused to bow. Ki Higid LaHem Asher Hu Yihudi, Mordechai refused for religious reasons, out of an unwillingness to bow to Haman’s idol. However, only one generation back, when Nevuchadnetzar unveiled an idol of his own, all the Jews bowed to it, and so Haman became very frustrated at not only the attitude of Mordechai, but also the inconsistent practices of the Jewish nation as a whole. As the pasuk (3:6) states, it was not enough for Haman to harm Mordechai, for the servants had informed Haman of Mordechai’s nationality, and so Haman sought to destroy Mordechai’s entire nation.

The students of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai once asked [their teacher], “Why did all the Jews deserve destruction?” He replied, “You tell me,” to which they proposed, “Because they attended Achashveirosh’s party?” Rabbi Shmon responded, “But then only the Jews in Shushan should have been slated for annihilation?” to which the Talmidim exclaimed, “so you tell us.” Rabbi Shimon answered, “Because they all bowed down to [Nevuchadnetzar’s] idol.”

Meseches Megilah, 12a

At the very root of Chachmah lies consistency. Mordechai’s persistence to sit at his post – even though he was led around town on the King’s horse, once the reward ended he returned to the gates – earned him the respect of the King. He himself was consistent in his actions, and so there was no opening to indict him. And within his persistence and consistency is the wherewithal to never impulsively react to another’s emotions.

It gives new meaning to the concept Marbeh BiYishiva Marbeh BiChachmah, especially considering Mordechai was Yosheiv BiSha’ar HaMelech.

In retrospect, this is the very midah of Chachmah that Shlomo HaMelech so professionally exhibits. Two mothers apprach with heartfelt pleas, yet Shlomo remains calm enough to use their own emotions against them, instead of letting his own emotions get the better of him.

True Chachmah, unlike the advice of Zeresh, is divorced from the emotions that complement one’s perception of the law. We can keep a Chok because we don’t ask ourselves whether it makes sense. When our emotions determine our system of laws, we become estranged from the Chukim, and we also become inconsistent and hypocritical as our emotions and reactions vary from day to day. The Chukim, therefore, are our Chachmah and Binah, the anchor that makes us appear straight, steadfast, and consistent, in the eyes of the Goyim.

In contrast, there are other times when it is proper not to sit, proper to take action. When Mordechai discovers Haman’s plans to destroy Klal Yisrael, he immediately instructs Esther to entreat the King on behalf of her people (4:8). When Esther hesitates, Mordechai lashes, “U’Mi Yodei’ah Im LaEis KaZos HiGa’at LiMalchus, who knows whether it was for an opportunity like this that you ascended to royalty.” Mordechai seems certain that the proper plan of action is for Esther to get up and approach the King, even though she will be risking her life, even though he is uncertain himself whether this is Esther’s destiny. How then does Mordechai choose when to sit idly by and when to get up and take proactive force?

There is a clear distinction to be made between the impulsive reactions of a fool and those of a Tzadik like Mordechai HaYihudi. When Mordechai reacts, he acts in accordance with what he believes the Ratzon of Hashem to be. It was Haman’s desire that Mordechai bow, but Hashem’s desire that Mordechai not bow, and so Mordechai easily chose not to bow. But when Esther was sent to speak to the King, Mordechai was acting in hopes of fulfilling Hashem’s Ratzon, in hopes of preserving his nation’s existence and eradicating Amaleik from existence. Therefore, it was proper to react, for his reaction was not in accordance with another person’s desires, but rather in accordance with the Torah he fought so stalwartly to maintain.

And so when we keep our Torah, when we observe the Chukim as steadfastly as we legislate the Mishpatim, we establish a closer connection to HaKadosh Baruch Hu, thus furthering our spiritual growth, and bringing ourselves closer to our ultimate Geula. Even the Goyim recognize this incredible potential

Achashveirsoh sent for the sages of the Umos HaOlam, and they all came to him. He said to them: Should I eradicate this nation [the Jews] from the world? They immediately responded: How could you do so?!... [A]ll the other nations of the world are called Nochrim, foreigners, in front of Hashem, but Yisrael are called Krovim, relatives, as the pasuk (Tehilim 148:14) says “LiBnei Yisrael Am K’rovo…”

…[A]nd not only that, but no nation is closer to Hashem than Yisrael, as the pasuk (Devarim 4:7) says “Ki Mi Goi Gadol Asher Lo Elohim Kerovim Ailav KaHashem Elokeinu BiChol Kori’einu Ailav,” what other nation has a G-d as close to them as Hashem is to us when we call out to Him.”

Midrash Esther Rabbah, 7:13

Karov Hashem LiChol Kori’av LiChol Asher Yikrau’hu BiEmes

Tehilim, 145:18

Parashat Va'Eira

Rashi’s peirush on the Chumash is often vague and unclear, and some ambiguities perceivably border heresy. One such example appears in this week’s parasha; when Hahsem declares ViNasati Es Yadi BiMitzrayim, Rashi comments that Hashem is referring to His literal hand, Yad Mamash. Undoubtedly Rashi does not mean to ascribe HaKadosh Baruch Hu an actual physical body, but what does he mean? The Gur Aryeh explains that Rashi intends to distinguish between G-d’s physical interaction with the world and His metaphysical influence. In Lashon HaTorah, a Yad can refer to someone’s hand, but it can also refer to his will or capability. When Lavan chases after Ya’akov with malicious intent, he explains Yeish LiEl Yadi La’Asos Imachem Ra, I could have done evil toward you. Clearly, Lavan is not referring to his literal hand but rather to his capabilities. Therefore, Rashi must inform us when the pasuk refers to a Yad Mamash; in our parasha, Hashem is not saying that he will exert His will over Mitzrayim, but rather that He will hit Mitzrayim physically, as if He possessed a literal hand.

However, sometimes the difficulties with Rashi’s comments are more subtle, and often those comments are even more troubling:

Hu Aharon U’Moshe Asher Amar Hashem LaHem Hotze’u Es Bnei Yisrael Mei’Eretz Mitzrayim Al Tzivosam (Shemos 6:26)

Hu Aharon U’Moshe: Sometimes the pasuk places Aharon before Moshe, and sometime the pasuk places Moshe before Aharon, to say that they are Shkulin Ki’Echad, equally great.

Rashi, Shemos 6:26

Certainly Rashi would never consider Aharon to be Moshe’s equal! The Torah teaches us quite explicitly Lo Kam Navi Od BiYisrael KiMoshe, that no Navi ever reached Moshe’s greatness. How then can Rashi claim that Aharon and Moshe are equally great, of equal weight?

Rav Moshe Feinstein answers that while no future Navi will ever match Moshe in terms of personal accomplishment, every individual bears the capability of fulfilling his maximum potential, as Moshe did. Aharon may not have possessed the capability to reach Moshe’s level of greatness, but – like his brother – he did not squander an ounce of his potential. And for that, he was deserving of being mentioned before his younger brother in our parasha.

But Rav Moshe’s answer is largely unsatisfying, for it does not actually address the question at hand. It establishes a comparison between Aharon and Moshe – they both achieved 100% of their potential – but it fails to place Aharon on Moshe’s actual level of greatness. Pasuk 26 states Hu AHaron U’Moshe, while pasuk 27 ends Hu Moshe ViAharon, thus placing the pasuk that attributes greatness to Aharon before the one that exalts Moshe. But by our given explanation, though one would expect both Moshe and Aharon to be praised, Moshe’s acclaim should certainly precede Aharon’s!

Indeed, weighting the percentages of Moshe and Aharon’s achieved potential proves a poor gauge of equality, for it assumes that a man cannot exceed 100% of his potential. However, Moshe indeed does exceed his natural potential when he begs HaKadosh Baruch Hu, “Hareini Na Es KiVodecha!” Moshe’s request seems thematically disconnected from the story of Hashem’s forgiveness over Cheit HaEigel; therefore, the midrash expounds that Moshe was not Ra’oi to see G-d’s glory; Moshe therefore waited until Hashem was in a good mood. When Moshe was in G-d’s best graces, he then asked for an invaluable favor. Aharon may have achieved 100% of his potential, but Moshe achieved 101%! The two are unfortunately still not equal. What then did Rashi mean? How are Moshe and Aharon Shkulin KiEchad?

To fully understand Rashi’s explanation, we must look closer at the context of these two pasukim. The description Hu Aharon U’Moshe, Hu Moshe ViAharon serves as the climax of a brief genealogical recapitulation, a recap sandwiched by two very similar dialogues between Moshe and Hashem:

And Hashem spoke to Moshe saying: Come speak to Paroh the King of Mitzrayim, and he will send the Bnei Yisrael from his land. And Moshe spoke in front of Hashem saying: Behold, [if] the Bnei Yisrael have not listened to me, how will Paroh ever listen?! I have blocked lips! (Shemos 6:10-12)

And Hashem spoke to Moshe saying: I am Hashem, speak to Paroh King of Mitzrayim all that I have spoken to you. And Moshe spoke in front of Hashem: Behold, I have blocked lips, how will Paroh listen to me?!” (Shemos 6:28-29)

VaYomeir Moshe Lifnei Hashem: This is the dialogue above, where it says “the Bnei Yisrael have not listened to me.” The pasuk repeats [the discussion], for it was [textually] broken [and now resumed], like a person who says “let us return to the original topic.”

Rashi, Shemos 6:29

But are these really the same dialogue? The first time Moshe complains about being an Aral Sifasayim, we are told VaYidabeir Hashem El Moshe ViEl Aharon VaYitzaveim El Bnei Yisrael ViEl Paroh Melech Mitzrayim LiHotzee Es Bnei Yisrael Mei’Eretz Mitzrayim, the commandment first entails a speech to the nation, and afterwards to Paroh. However, after Moshe’s second complaint, 15 pasukim later, Hashem responds Re’aih Nisatichah Elohim LiFaroh ViAharon Yihiyeh Nive’acha, entirely excluding the Bnei Yisrael’s role in the instructions! Perhaps what Rashi means to clarify is that these two conversations did not happen one after the other; rather, Moshe raised two problems and Hashem provided two respective solutions. The Torah recognizes the need for one to precede the account of Moshe and Aharon’s family tree, but felt the other should be directly attached to the ensuing narrative, namely the remainder of our parasha. Why this is so remains to be seen, but it would first help to identify what Moshe’s problems and Hashem solutions actually are.

A tremendous difficulty arises when analyzing Moshe’s complaints. Moshe draws a flawed Kal ViChomer. He reasons that if the Bnei Yisrael refuse to listen to him, why would Paroh ever receive his message, but the reason why the Bnei Yisrael did not listen was MiKotzeir Ruach U’Mei’Avoda Kasha, because they were out of breath from their arduous labor. Such a constraint does not apply to Paroh. Granted there was little likelihood that Paroh would receive Moshe’s words, but what proof could Moshe ever draw from the Bnei Yisrael’s reaction (or lack thereof)?

The Sifsei Chachamim propose that Moshe simply was unaware of the nation’s Kotzeir Ruach, but this answer is weak, for the pasukim’s dialogue would bear no ultimate effect on our story’s narrative. The Gur Aryeh identifies the Kal ViChomer differently: if the Bnei Yisrael will not oblige to better their predicament, why would Paroh ever oblige to worsen his situation? However, this interpretation assumes the Bnei Yisrael’s awareness that quitting their jobs and moving their families out of their homes and into the desert was to their advantage, and that assumption is simply illogical. What could Moshe’s Kal ViChomer possibly be?

If we look closely at Rashi’s Dibbur HaMaschil, we note that he identifies the phrase “ViEich Yishma’einee Paroh” as the Kal ViChomer itself. A Kal ViChomer is, by definition, comprised of two components, and Paroh’s obstinacy is only one of these two components, namely the Chomer, the mission impossible. Why doesn’t Rashi’s heading extend to the Kal, the Bnei Yisrael’s rejection? Perhaps Moshe’s Kal ViChomer doesn’t compare Paroh’s reaction to the Bnei Yirael’s after all. Perhaps it compares to Paroh’s reaction in last week’s parasha.

Towards the end of Parashat Shemos, Moshe gathers together the leaders of the Bnei Yisrael and leads the nation to Paroh’s palace, where he demands a three day vacation on behalf of Hashem. Paroh refuses and sends the nation back to work, despite their clear support of Moshe’s side. In our parasha, Moshe reasons that if Paroh refused to let the nation go even when they supported him, how in the world would Paroh consent if Moshe’s demand now carries zero support?!

The Kal ViChomer now fits perfectly into place, as does Hashem’s response. Hashem commands “them,” both Moshe and Aharon, to first address the nation and regain their support. Only then can Moshe complete the task set forth in pasuk 11, to demand the release of the nation from Paroh’s land. Aharon is directed to stir the Bnei Yisrael from the doldrums of their Kotzeir Ruach; the job set forth is one for the professional orator. Aharon was just the motivational speaker the Bnei Yisrael needed to hear (as opposed to Moshe, who failed to arouse the nation in pasuk 9).

However, even with the Bnei Yisrael’s support, one obstacle remained. There was still no sufficient reason for Paroh to accommodate Moshe’s demands. Moshe certainly was not a convincing or persuasive arbiter, and so his problem is repeated in pasuk 29, but no longer in relation to the Bnei Yisrael’s refusal. This time Hashem answers that Moshe shall be like a god over Paroh, an exceedingly powerful entity, and Paroh will eventually have no choice but to oblige. Aharon could still stand at Moshe’s side, as was agreed upon in the previous parasha (see 4:15), but he would no longer play the primary role, as he did in their address to the nation.

The parasha therefore outlines and separates two distinct duties Moshe and Aharon carried. First, they address the nation; afterwards, they confront Paroh. The speech to the Bnei Yisrael was important, but it does not directly relate to the stories of the Esser Makos; therefore, it was not necessary to establish juxtaposition between the two accounts. Moshe’s role as a god over Paroh, on the other hand, stands at the very crux of the Makos’ impact, and so it was of virtually dire importance to be repeated and connected to rest of the parasha.

If we look closely at the two pasukim, the descriptions Hu Aharon U’Moshe Hu Moshe ViAharon, we find that the parasha quite explicitly outlines two separate tasks:

He is Aharon and Moshe whom Hashem said to them to take Bnei Yisrael out of Mitzrayim by their legions. They are the ones who spoke to Paroh King of Mitzrayim to take Bnei Yisrael from Mitzrayim, he is Moshe and Aharon.

Shemos 6:26-27

Pasuk 26 details the need to address the nation, there is no mention of Paroh; therefore, Aharon’s name precedes Moshe’s, for Aharon and his rhetoric played the primary – and most necessary – role in rousing the Bnei Yisrael. Pasuk 27 describes the confrontation with Paroh; there, Moshe’s name precedes Aharon’s for it was his turn to shine as an Elohim.

Perhaps when Rav Feinstein describes Rashi to be equating the achieved potential of Moshe and Aharon, he is not only measuring each man’s greatness achieved against his potential, but also the role each individual plays in assisting others to reach their greatest potential. Moshe ended his life as history’s greatest Navi, but he would have never even gotten the Bnei Yisrael out of Mitzrayim were it not for the convincing rhetoric of his older brother. Before we can even begin to discuss Moshe’s greatness, we must talk of Aharon’s, and so Hu Aharon U’Moshe naturally precedes Hu Moshe ViAharon.

The concept of being Skulin Ki’Echad is not the same as being Shaveh. Moshe my have accomplished more than Aharon, and he may have even achieved a greater percentage of his potential. But Moshe’s accomplishments were only in light of his brother’s, and so Aharon received Schar for anything he enabled Moshe to eventually perform. Because of their unparalleled partnership, the two were weighed equally in heaven, one man’s actions counting in the other’s favor, and our pasukim express their consequential “equality” via the order of their names. While no man may ever reach Moshe’s levels of greatness in this world, we all have much to strive for when considering the multitude of actions one can be judged for, and the millions of potential external merits that pave our path to the Next World.

At first, we may have regarded Rashi’s comments as pure homeletics, thus avoiding the dangers of Kfira; but ironically, we now see just how fundamental the notions he expresses truly are.

Good Shabbos

Parashat VaYechi

VaYikra Ya’akov El Banav VaYomeir HeiAsifu ViAgida Lachem Es Asher Yikra Eschem BiAcharis HaYamim. Hikavitzu ViShimu Bnei Ya’akov ViShimu El Yisrael Avichem. (Beraishis 49:1-2)

ViAgida Lachem, and I will tell you: [Ya’akov] wished to reveal the [events leading to the end of all exiles], but the Shechina was lifted from him, so he began to talk about other things.

Rashi, Beraishis 49:1

The mifarshim are left utterly perplexed over Rashi’s words. The Mizrachi asks, “Rashi here quotes a Midrash; I don’t know where this idea comes from! Why can’t the pasuk simply refer to the events that Ya’akov does allude to, the events that would eventually befall each and every Sheivet?!” Perhaps we have a Kaballah, an ancestral tradition, the Mizrachi hopelessly concludes.

The Sifsei Chachamim surmise that the term Hikavitzu hints towards the future Kibutz Goleos, and perhaps the Midrash is unveiling this esoteric remez. But the Mizrachi’s question remains strong, for we clearly see within the Brachos to each and every Sheivet a reference to their future descendents. It is tremendously difficult to suggest that the Shechina departs from Ya’akov, that he suddenly loses his ability to prophesy the nation’s future; indeed, that is all Ya’akov Avinu does for the next 25 pasukim!

Apparently, Ya’akov’s inability to unveil the Keitz plays a fundamental role in the foundation of our parasha. VaYechi is the only parasha in the Sefer Torah not to be preceded by a textual gap, and Chazal attribute this “closing” of the gap to the abrupt closing of knowledge from Ya’akov Avinu, namely his sudden inability to reveal the Keitz. Again, the mifarshim are left scratching their heads, but for a different reason. If the closed gap alludes to the closing of information from Ya’akov, then why would this Stumah appear at the opening of our parasha? More appropriately, it should precede the pasuk where Ya’akov gathers his children. The Sifsei Chachamim again attempt at a solution, explaining that the Torah can only emphasize the presence of a Stumah by placing it somewhere inexplicably unexpected. But the Sifsei Chachamim’s answer is lacking in all too many ways. They fail to answer their own question; the Stumah is still out of place.

There is certainly nothing basic about Chazal’s description of Ya’akov’s spiritual breakdown, especially when we consider how it flies in the face of everything we imagine Ya’akov Avinu to represent in his closing years! The image of Ya’akov conveyed in Parashat VaYechi is one of a wizened and wearisome man, an elder of 147 years, committed to his sickbed. VaYikrivu Yimei Yisrael Lamus, Ya’akov introduces the parasha by planning his own funeral! Yet Chazal teach us that the pasukim never say VaYamas Ya’akov because Ya’akov never died; although the pasukim do explicitly chronicle Ya’akov’s embalmment process, we understand Chazal’s diyuk to refer to the spirit of Ya’akov and its transcendence of his physical lifespan. Seemingly, as Ya’akov Avinu physically deteriorates, his spirit remains in perfect shape. But why then should the Shechina depart from him?

It seems that Ya’akov indeed was in superior shape on a spiritual scale, and that the Shechina did normally reside with him. But as a consequence for his attempt to unveil the Keitz, his prescient faculties were sealed. Therefore, Ya’akov was not necessarily incapable of perceiving and relating the Acharis Yamim; instead, Hashem simply did not allow him to do so. Our parasha, therefore, does not necessarily outline the fading legacy of a deteriorating man.

In fact, the Maschil LiDavid insists that the Ya’akov described in our parasha’s opening account, the one planning his funeral, is not even weak or sick or bed stricken at all. Ya’akov bows to the head of his bead, but he’s not necessarily sitting in the bed. There is no mention of him mustering the strength to sit up when Yoseif enters the room. Granted, Rashi proves from Ya’akov’s actions that the Shechina resides over the head of a Choleh’s bed, but when Ya’akov chastises Reuvein for switching his beds, Rashi notes that the Yitzu’ee Alah, the One who ascends [Ya’akov’s] bed, is a reference to HaKadosh Baruch Hu’s Shechina, which always resided over Ya’akov’s bed! (The Maschil LiDavid rather explains that Rashi means “we see from our parasha where on the bed the Shechina resides.” This understanding fits perfectly with the gemara in Nedarim (40a) which proves that the Shechina rests over a Choleh’s bed from a pasuk in Tehilim, and not from our parasha, since our parasha only shows where on beds, in the general case, the Shechina is normally found, namely the Rosh MaMitah.)

One might wonder why Ya’akov would start planning his funeral before falling ill. The Midrash (Beraishis Rabbah, 65:9) describes Hashem’s promise to forewarn Ya’akov of his imminent death through the development of sickness, thus allowing Ya’akov to bless all his children as close to his death as possible. Ya’akov then shouldn’t have to worry about funeral plans until he gets sick. One might also wonder why Ya’akov repeated his instructions to be buried in Eretz Yisrael right before his death.

But perhaps the most confounding aspect of our story’s chronology, whether Ya’akov was healthy or sick or somewhere in between, is the fact that he sends for Yoseif twice – once with all the brothers and once without. The first time, Ya’akov plans his funeral, and the second time, he issues the Brachos. But if Ya’akov thought he was dying when he first called Yoseif in, why didn’t he call all the brothers in to receive their Brachos? And if Ya’akov knew he wasn’t dying, why was there any need to immediately contact Yoseif?

Ya’akov wasn’t sick yet, and he knew he wouldn’t die without first falling ill. But if Ya’akov wasn’t dying, why did he need to make Yoseif swear to bring him back to Eretz Yisrael? More to the point, if Ya’akov wasn’t physically changed at the start of our parasha, what change then caused him to so suddenly send for Yoseif? Perhaps if Ya’akov wasn’t physically changed, he was spiritually changed. When the parasha opens with a Stumah, a description of Ya’akov’s sudden lapse of Ruach HaKodesh, it isn’t necessarily describing a single event that occurs later in the parasha. In fact, Ya’akov’s failed revelation of the Acharis HaYamim is not the only time in our parasha that Rashi describes the Shechina to remove itself:

“And now, the two children borne to you in Eretz Mitzrayim before I came to you in Mitzrayim, they will be mine. Ephraim and Menashe are like Reuvein and Shimon to me…” And Yisrael saw the children of Yoseif, and he said, “who are these?” And Yoseif replied to his father, “they are my children which Hashem has given me through this,” and [Ya’akov] said, “take them to me, and I shall bless them.”

Beraishis, 48:5,8-9

Ya’akov clearly recognizes Yoseif’s two sons, and holds them in high regard, for he initially addresses them as equals of Reuvein and Shimon. But Ya’akov’s tone abruptly changes, and all of a sudden, he starts firing questions. Rashi explains that when Ya’akov tried to bless Yoseif’s children, the Shechina immediately departed, leading Ya’akov to believe that the children were unfit for a Bracha. However, Yoseif prayed for Rachamim, and the Shechina returned. All the while, we see that the Shechina’s presence is not a given or guarantee through our parasha’s storyline; rather, it comes and goes.

Perhaps, the Stumah at the opening of our parasha does chronologically indicate the first closing of knowledge from Ya’akov Avinu. Once Ya’akov even considers revealing the Keitz to his sons, ViNistam Mimenu. Unlike by the gathering of the children, the Midrash does not actually say that the Shechina departed from Ya’akov; rather, Hashem sent a warning, indicating that as much as Ya’akov would in the future want to reveal the Keitz, and as much as he might try, Hashem would never permit him to do so.

The Gur Aryeh explains beautifully that Ya’akov knew the Galuos ahead would weaken Klal Yisrael’s morale, and so he believed that the best Bracha he could offer his children was the assurance that the Galuos would eventually end. The future stories of their salvation would provide the much needed boost in morale, and leave the nation with a crystal clear path to Teshuva. But Hashem disagreed. Hashem knew that descriptions of Acharis HaYamim would ease the arduous period of exile for Tzadikim Gemurim like the Bnei Ya’akov, but later generations would become all too comfortable with their predicaments if they were assured a date and description for their eventual Geulah. Ya’akov’s Gilui HaKeitz would ultimately stunt the Bnei Yisrael’s spiritual growth.

Therefore, the change that Ya’akov Avinu undergoes at the beginning of our parasha is far from one of deterioration, neither physically nor spiritually, but instead one of recognition. Ya’akov learns that Brachos don’t necessarily require foresight and prescience. The key to bringing ultimate Geula rests not in the telling of stories, not in the descriptions of what Acharis HaYamim will look like, but rather in the descriptions of the people who bring Geula to fruition. Ya’akov recognizes that by predicting the events of the future, he reduces Klal Yisrael’s motivation to act, but by describing the attributes that each Sheivet would ultimately behold, the pride strength and determination each Sheivet would respectively express, he motivates the individuals to reach their goals, setting each component of Klal Yisrael off in a productive path. In short, Ya’akov learns that future events are only a consequence of predictable personal attributes, so that there is no difference between predicting the Acharis HaYamim and bestowing each Sheivet with certain qualities, except that the latter form doesn’t compromise the nation’s motivation.

It is exactly this recognition that spurs Ya’akov’s actions in our parasha opening pasukim! When Ya’akov instructs Yoseif to bury him in Eretz Yisrael, the emphasis is not on the burial, but rather on Yoseif’s need to swear. Ya’akov pleads Sim Na Yadcha Tachas Yireichi, begging Yoseif to make a vow. And when Yoseif merely assures his father Anochi E’eseh KiD’varecha, but does not swear, Ya’akov insists “Hishava Li.” Yoseif ultimately obliges. Of course Ya’akov trusted Yoseif to do as instructed, so why wasn’t Ya’akov satisfied until Yoseif took a Shvua? Perhaps the Shvua did little for Ya’akov’s ease of mind, but rather aided Yoseif’s request to Paroh:

[Paroh allows Yoseif to bury Ya’akov in Eretz Yisrael,] “Ka’Asheir Hishbi’acha, just as you [Yoseif] swore to [your father, Ya’akov].” (Beraishis 50:6)

Were it not for the oath, I would never have permitted you. But I am afraid to tell you to violate your oath, so that you do not respond, “In that case, I will violate my oath not to reveal [that I know] Lashon HaKodesh, one more language than you [know], for you are not familiar with it.”

Rashi, Beraishis 50:6

The attitude Rashi describes here, Paroh’s attitude, is one very contrary to Yoseif’s. Yoseif always looked for Chein, for a level of partnership that transcended petty favors. But Paroh could was a man of debt and compromise – in fact the name Paroh comes from the root Pei-Reish-Ayin, to owe. Paroh was a man who would only compromise his favor to Yoseif in return that Yoseif not expose his shortcomings. Aside from blackmail, Yoseif had no influence over Paroh because Paroh owed him nothing.

At the opening of Parashat VaYechi, Ya’akov learns that the key to ensuring a positive outcome is to manipulate future events through others’ personalities and attributes. Those attributes are what determine how individuals will act and react long into the future. Ya’akov recognizes that Paroh would never allow him to leave Mitzrayim, but he saw the tremendous advantage Yoseif could carry by having to fulfill his father’s Shvua. And so Ya’akov forced his son to take a Shvua, and in fact that Shvua was the only argument that compelled Paroh to let Ya’akov leave. The story of Ya’akov’s burial itself becomes a microcosmic Geula, not only because it transfers Yisrael’s body from Eretz Mitzrayim to Eretz Yisrael, but that it shows that the elements that ultimately bring this transfer to fruition, namely Yoseif’s Shvua, were put into place long before Ya’akov Avinu died!

But while the attributes of the Goyim could be acted upon immediately, Ya’akov was still hesitant to bless his children. We see this same hesitation by Moshe Rabbeinu at the beginning of Parashat ViZos HaBeracha, where Moshe blesses each Sheivet – as Rashi there explains – because “Im Lo Achshav Eimasai.” In other words, Moshe knew that he could not rebuke the nation once he gave them their Brachos; therefore, he waited until his final opportunity. Ya’akov too waited until his very last moment, until he was sick, because the rebuke and Brachos could not later be amended. But his plan to undermine Paroh’s authority did not involve rebuke or Brachos, just a simple prediction and calculation of human nature, and so Ya’akov chose not to delay forcing his son Yoseif into Shvua.

The parasha now flows beautifully. Ya’akov first is warned by Hashem that he will not be able to relate the Keitz to his sons, and the lessons he learns through Hashem’s warning translate into a brilliant plan to eventually get him extracted from Eretz Mitzrayim. Later, when he falls ill, he tries to reveal the Keitz, but cannot, and reverts to describing the character within each of his sons, residing more on what types of people they will be than what wars they will fight and what lands they will settle. And lastly, Yoseif buries his father as he swore.

The Mizrachi, Sifsei Chachamim, and many others struggle terribly to identify how Rashi knows Ya’akov tried to be Migaleh the Keitz to his sons. Perhaps the inference comes from the very words contained in Rashi’s Dibur HaMaschil. What does Ya’akov mean when he says ViAgida Lachem? Does he refer to the description of character or attributes? The lashon of Hagadah is one of storytelling, one that connotes Ya’akov’s plans to reveal actual events, not attributes. But when Ya’akov doesn’t reveal any events, we see that Ya’akov’s initial plan clearly did not work, that he was forced to revert to individual Brachos.

There is an interesting remez to this transition within the pasuk. Ya’akov promises to foretell the events Es Asheir Yikra Eschem, that which will happen to you. But the word Yikra, normally spelled with a Hey at the end, is here spelled with an Aleph, changing the meaning of the word from “happen” to “call.” The pasuk reads “that which will happen to you,” but it can likewise be understood as “that which you will be called by.” In this subtle play on words, we see the mutual nature between the character one beholds and the events that one causes and partakes in. Ya’akov indeed guarantees an end of days, but not one highlighted by quests or conquests. Instead, it is one highlighted by the emotions of pride, determination, and hope contained within each son.

LiShu’asicha Kivisi Hashem. Good Shabbos.