Parashat BaMidbar

And Hashem spoke to Moshe saying: And I have taken the Levi’im from amongst the Bnei Yisrael in every Jewish firstborn’s stead, and the Levi’im will work for Me. For every firstborn belongs to Me; from the day that I smote every firstborn in Mitzrayim, I separated every Jewish firstborn – from man to animal – to be for Me, I am Hashem.

BaMidbar, 3:11-13

Rashi explains that Hashem did not originally appoint the Levi’im to serve Him; rather, the Bechorim lost their privilege when they served the Eigel HaZahav. As we know, any Kohein who serves Avoda Zara is indefinitely invalidated from performing Hashem’s Avoda, and so the Halacha was no different for these Bechorim. Therefore, when Hashem chooses the Levi’im for His Avoda in these three pasukim, His choice is not reiterating obvious and known facts.

However, Rashi’s explanation blatantly contrasts the very words of our pasukim! Somehow, the selection of the Levi’im is directly connected to Makas Bechoros. Somehow, the replacement of the Bechorim relates significantly to the plague they survived the previous year. How then can Rashi come along and link our pasukim’s basis to Cheit Ha’Eigel, as sensible or sound as his explanation appears?

On second thought, it’s difficult to imagine that our pasukim come to teach us about the selection of the Levi’im and the replacement of the bechorim, for the previous pasukim just described all the work that the Levi’im would do! Hakreiv Es Matei Levi, put Sheivet Lev in charge of the Mishkan. Do these commands belong before Sheivet Levi replaces the Bechorim, or after the Temurah? Clearly, it belongs after, so why in the world should it precede Hinei Lakachti Es HaLivi’im?!

But before we can explain the reversal of these two parashiot, and before we can explain the correlation between the Pidyon Bechorim and Makas Bechoros, we must first speculate as to whether the service to Hashem here is a form of Srara, officiation, or of Avdus, indignation. Is this service a privilege or a burden?

When we look back at the aftermath of Makas Bechoros, the Kli Yakar muses, we see that each firstborn is forced to pay a Pidyon to Hashem in return for having been preserved; such action suggests that the result of their salvation from Mitzrayim, the position they entered into, was one of Avdus to Hashem. But it is hard to believe that the Levi’im’s good behavior at Cheit HaEigel would prompt their replacement of the Bechorim as Hashem’s slaves; clearly, the Levi’im are entering in to a privileged position of officiation.

Clearly, the Kli Yakar continues, Avodas Hashem is a privilege and not a burden. Furthermore, it is a mistake to think that the Bechorim were forced into this Avoda because Hashem spared them during Makas Bechoros, for they were selected for service from a much earlier time (see the Ibn Ezra). Therefore, we must explain the effects of being saved from Makas Bechoros exclusively as the need for Pidyon.

The Kli Yakar leaves us with a conclusive outlook of these three pasukim. The fact that the Bechorim were selected for Avoda has nothing to do with Makas Bechoris, nor does the selection of the Levi’im. The Bechorim were disqualified at Cheit HaEigel, along with eleven other Shvatim, and the Levi’im were thus selected MiToch Bnei Yisrael, by default. But as a disqualified officer of G-d, each Bechor would have a strong argument not to pay the (potential) additional five shekel fine to each Levi; he’s already been punished, what right does Hashem have to punish him more? To that Hashem responds, “Ki Li Kol Bechor, every Bechor is doubly guilty in My eyes, for I spared them the first time they deserved to die, and yet they still sinned against me!”

Looking back at pasuk 12, we see that Hashem’s remark “Lakachti Es HaLevi’im” is not meant as an exaltation of the Sheivet, but rather as a jab at the Bechorim; the full context reads “Lakachti Es HaLevi’im… Tachas Kol Bechor.” In this initial pasuk, we detail the replacement of the Bechorim, and in the next pasuk, we justify their payment, Ki Li Kol Bechor. All in all, we see that there was never any consideration of placing these pasukim before Hakreiv Es Matei Levi, for the Bechorim would have nobody to pay had the Levi’im not been inaugurated.

Likewise, the census Moshe conducts is broken into two phases; first the Levi’im are counted, and then the Bechorim. Naturally, one would expect the Bechorim to first be accounted for – then each Levi can arrive as his respective Bechor’s replacement. But the census, in reality, was not the process of replacement, but rather an effect; only after the Bechorim are replaced do they require this redemption – either through a human swap of sorts, or through a payment to Aharon HaKohein and his sons.

Within this concept of redemption, as opposed to replacement, comes the insertion of interpersonal emotions not normally associated to consequence and punishement. However, when one considers the nature of said consequences, the reversal of the attendant and the outsider, and the attendants’ actual need to act as the Zar’s messenger to HaKadosh Baruch Hu, then it becomes clear why such a payment is necessary. The very fact that the Bechorim could sin against Hashem in spite of their immunity from Makas Bechoros indicates a blatant disregard of Hakaras HaTov. While the rest of Klal Yisrael could accept the Kehuna’s upheaval with ease, the Bechorim would struggle to accredit the proper regard to those positioned above them – regardless of petty grudges. Therefore, each one was forced to pay his fellow Levi, to express a true feeling of connection to his representative Korban-bringer. And only then, with this unified HaKaras HaTov for the Levi’im’s Avoda, could the Mishkan be established.

Parashat Emor

At the center of Parshat Emor lies the complete list of Yamim Tovim, Asher Tikra’u Mikra’ei Kodesh. Pesach, Shavuos, Rosh HaShana,Yom Kipper, and lastly Succos. The details enumerated are rather predictable; we mention the general Issurei Melacha, the collection of Korbanos, and the various Halachos belonging to each respective Mo’eid. The central theme seems pretty much obvious, and all these Inyanim presumably belong within the parasha; yet Rashi’s comments suggest just the opposite:

“And you shall offer a fire to Hashem for [Pesach’s] seven days. The seventh day [of Pesach] will be holy, and you shall not do any work.”
VaYikra, 23:8

ViHikravtem Isheh LaHashem, these are the Korbanei Musaf which are stated in Parashat Pinchas [as well]. And why are they mentioned here? To tell you that one Korban Mussaf does not affect the others [meaning, if one fails to bring one day’s Korban Mussaf, he nonetheless retains his obligation to bring the next day’s Mussaf].
Rashi, VaYikra 23:8

The Sifra, as quoted by Rashi, makes a seemingly unsubstantiated assumption. The Midrash identifies the mention of the Korbanos Musaf in our parasha as an indication that the Korbanos do not function as a complete set but rather as individual obligations, but there is no such indication from the pasuk. Maybe we could have learned from our pasuk that the Musafin are Mi’akeiv each other! The drasha is totally arbitrary!

Perhaps even more problematic is the fact that the drasha is based on the very assumption that our pasuk is out of place. The Midrash asserts that the topic of Korban Mussaf has no place in our parasha, but the Mussaf is by no means the only Korban in our parasha. We elaborate on the Omer, and detail the entire process of the Shtei HaLechem. When all the Korbanos of all the Moad’im are mentioned, how can we point to one particular Korban – or in this case, the majority of the Korbanos – and call it out of place!?

Interestingly, the distinction one can draw between the Omer/Shtei HaLechem offerings and the Mussaf Korbanos – namely the respective presence or absence of grain (or bread) – is a theme that continuously appears across the various topics covered by this parasha. We discuss which Kohanim cannot offer Korbanos – either due to physical defect or improper action – and which ones can eat from Kodesh, and which animals can be offered as Kodesh, and every time we refer to the Korbanos, we term them Lechem.

Rashi explains that we are not referring to literal bread, for there is no bread ever placed onto the Mizbeiach; rather, Lechem refers to any meal. The pasuk in Daniel says that Ba’alshatzar made a great feast, and the term used for “feast” is L’Cheim, so we see that any Seudah can be called Lechem. Therefore, when the pasuk says Lo Yikrav LiHakriv Lechem Elokav, this means that the blemished Kohein cannot offer any Korbanos to Hashem.

It is therefore relatively safe to assume that the on-topic Korbanos in our parahsa are those that involve bread, like the Shtei HaLechem and Omer, which are discussed in elobarate detail, and that the Mussafin are out of place because they lack this correlation to bread. However, if Rashi identifies any Korban – including a Korban Mussaf – to be a Lechem Elokav, how can we understand the Mussafin to be out of place and off-topic?

How can we understand that concept of a Korban being termed Lechem in the first place? One would speculate that a Korban resembles bread in the sense that both are meals, just as Rashi says. This means that placing a Korban on the Mizbei’ach is like serving a meal to HaKadosh Baruch Hu. However, if such was the meaning of the term Lechem, one would expect the section of Korbanos to begin with the most meal-like of all Korbanos, the Tamid, which is offered twice daily – once in the morning and once in the evening. And yet, there is not a single mention of the Korban Tamid in our entire parsha (not even by the Menorah later in the parasha, whose lighting is described relative to the Korban Tamid in Parashat BiHa’alosecha, but not in our parasha)!

Perhaps to gain a clearer understanding of how a Korban resembles a meal we should look to the Gemara in Berachos:

Rabbi Chanina Bar Papa said, “Anyone who derives benefit from this world without [first] saying a Brachah, it is as if he has stolen from HaKadosh Baruch Hu.”
Mesechet Berachos, 35b

The Ritva explains that man’s purpose in this world is to perform Avoda for Hashem. Avoda can manifest itself in many forms, and it is by no means limited to Hekdesh objects. For instance, the Avoda man performs with his food is the Brachah he makes on it, the recognition he expresses that everything in this world belongs to Hashem.

Rashi comments on Rabbi Chanina Bar Papa’s statement that it is actually not the food that is stolen from Hashem when one forgoes its Brachah, but rather the Brachah itself, Hashem is deprived of the very Avoda we were created to give Him. We see from Rashi’s remark that the food Hashem provides us with is not ideally to be offered back to Hashem, but rather used as the mere mechanism by which we thank Hashem for providing us with benefit. The Avoda we perform is not the offering of our food, but rather the eating of it, provided that we recognize HaKadosh Baruch Hu as the source of all our benefit.

Therefore, when Rashi equates a Korban to Lechem, he is by no means suggesting that we place a meal in front of Hashem, but rather that we place the meal in front of ourselves, that we ideally perform the Avoda of thanking Hashem for our food by turning it into a Korban. Appropriately enough, the first Korban listed in our parasha is the Korban Pesach, which we prepare and then partake of. We continue with the Korban Omer, which permits the consumption of Chadash, and then the Shtei HaLechem, which is accompanied by the Shtei K’Vasim, the only Korban Tzibur all year that can be eaten from – the rest are Olos, not Shlamim.

It therefore follows that the Mussafin listed in our parasha are indeed out of place, for they do not bear this resemblance to Lechem quite like the other Korbanos do. They are totally offered on the Mizbei’ach, totally burnt, like a meal placed in front of Hashem. Therefore we learn from their placement in our parasha that the Mussafin are not Mi’akeiv one another, that they cannot affect each other’s validity.

Had we considered the ideal Korban to be a meal placed in front of Hashem, an Olah, then we could have speculated that the Mussafin affect each other. Once we miss a single Korban, then the nature of Hashem’s meal has been drastically affected, we are placing an incomplete offering in front of him. But once we recognize that the ideal Korban is a meal placed in front of ourselves, simply the mechanism by which we offer recognition and thanks to our Creator, then what Hava Amina could we ever have that failure to offer a Korban Mussaf on Tuesday should affect the Korban Mussaf for Wednesday?! Our obligation to thank Hashem has in no way altered; we look for every opportunity to perform Hahsem’s Avoda on Wednesday, whether we missed an opportunity on Tuesday.

Along our parasha’s string of Korbanos, we come to recognize how every Avoda does not require the surrendering of our property to Hashem, but the opposite. We do not consecrate our possessions, but rather consecrate our actions, thus furthering our relationship with the Ribono Shel Olam. Through the Lechem we partake in, we come not to be only Mikadesh the bread itself, but also Mikadeish Hashem’s name.

Kidoshim Yihiyu LeiLokeihem ViLo YiChallilu Sheim Elokeihem Ki Es Ishei Hashem Lechem Elokeihem Heim Makrivim ViHayu Kodesh
VaYikra, 21:6

Purim '06

The story of Purim, the saga chronicled in the Megilas Esther, is often remembered as a clear and present highpoint along the tumultuous history of Yahadut, and for good reason. A sudden twist of fortune miraculously transforms the (seemingly) inevitable genocide of the Jewish nation into their most lopsided victory of all time. The nation acquires Achashveirosh’s trust and their enemies’ fear; soon, the masses convert (Esther 8:17) and Mordechai is appointed viceroy (10:3). What spurred such a remarkable upset? As the pasukim in Sefer Devarim teach us, our relationship with the Goyim is most prevalently dependant upon our relationship with HaKadosh Baruch Hu and our performance of His commandments:

And you shall guard and keep [Hashem’s Torah], for your adherence to all these Chukim will be your [source of] wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the Goyim, and they will say “What a wise and understanding nation these people are!”

Devarim 4:6

The pasuk describes the Mitzvos we perform as the very source of our wisdom. In essence, the Jewish Code of Law serves as a beacon of rationality and sensibility to the other nations; they see our behavior and follow our lead. But even more, the commandments we keep make sense to the Goyim, and so we earn the recognition as an intellectually superior nation, even if Hashem – and not we – is the intellectual source behind our laws.

And yet, at times, Mitzvos can function totally contrary to human rationale. In fact, the very concept of a Chok is that it be fulfilled without being understood, that it be followed for no greater reason than that Hashem commanded so! What then does the pasuk mean? Does our adherence to the Chukim serve as the source of our wisdom? The blind observance of Chukim may not in anyway undermine our potential wisdom, but they in no way enhance our intellectual prowess! How could the Goyim ever perceive our intellectual superiority through the analysis of our Chukim?!

In fact, the story of the Megilah suggests that our observance of the Chukim will strike exactly the opposite reaction! The Gemara in Meseches Megilah (13a) notes that when Haman HaRashah rose to power and forced all the King’s servants to bow to him, he placed a small idol against his chest so that each servant’s prostration would be directed not only at him, but also at his idol. Mordechai, therefore, refused to bow and thus worship Haman’s idol, a clear fulfillment of Hashem’s command, Lo Yihiyeh. But instead of Mordechai’s observance of the Mitzvah predicating Haman’s respect and reverence, his insurrection only angered and insulted Haman, much as we would expect. Granted, Mordechai’s fulfillment of the Mitzvos eventually resulted in the Jewish nation’s victory, but doesn’t the pasuk in Devarim ensure a much smoother road to greatness and respect?

Perhaps we could make more sense of this pasuk if we could come to a better understanding of the Chachmah that the other nations recognize in us. What is Chachmah?

Marbeh Yeshiva, Marbeh Chachmah, one who increases his sitting [in Torah study] increases his knowledge.

Pirkei Avos, 2:7

We often think of Chachmah as the accumulation of knowledge, or its intelligent application, both traits expressed by Shlomo HaMelech (in his judgment of the two women and their baby) the day Hashem proclaimed him the greatest Chacham ViNavon in history (see Malachim I, 3:12). Let’s see if this definition accords with Chazal’s understanding of the term. The shoresh ‘Chacham’ appears twice in the Megilah.

1) (1:13)When Queen Vashti enrages her husband Achashveirosh by refusing to parade in front of his party’s guests, Achashveirosh sends for his advisors, the Chachamim Yodei Ha’Itim. The gemara (Megilah 12b) identifies these scholars as the Rabbanan (in similar vein, the Midrash Esther Rabbah identifies them as the leaders of Shevet Yissachar). The gemara continues that Achashveirosh consulted them as to how best to deal with his wife’s insubordination, but the scholars were uncertain. They conferred, “if we tell him to kill her, then he will eventually calm down and then seek to kill us for catering to his fury. If we tell him to let her live, then we will indirectly cause the embarrassment of the king and surely be put to death!” The scholars therefore reasoned to Achashveirsoh that their powers of wisdom had ceased since the beginning of their exile, and so Achashveirosh was forced to call in the wise men of Amon and Moav instead: Karshina; Sheisar; Admasa; and so on. It is rather ironic that these Rabbanan be identified as Chachamim within the pasuk, for their very argument to the King was that they were ignorant. Indecision may have been the appropriate plan of action, but does that make it the manifestation of Chachamah?

2) (6:13) After Haman leads Mordechai around Shushan on the King’s horse, he returns home and tells his wife and friends about his recent misfortune, to which they respond “If Mordechai is from the seed of the Yihudim, then your ultimate downfall has begun, and there is no way to overcome him.” Chazal, again in the gemara (Megilah 16a), take note of the word Chachamav when Haman’s friends respond to him. In all other dialogues, the term Ohavav is used, but here the friends are termed scholars. Rabbi Yochanan explains: Anyone who says a scholarly thing – even [a scoundrel] from the other nations – is credited a Chacham. These scholars said to Haman, “if Mordechai is a descendant of either Yehuda’s or Yoseif’s, then you will surely fall to him [for each Sheivet was promised victory against their respective enemies], but if he is from another tribe, then you will ultimately prevail.”

Again it seems odd that Rabbi Yochanan (and the Megilah for that matter) identify this as a statement of Chachmah, for here we see a great deal of uncertainty within Haman’s friends’ prediction. We also see a gap in their knowledge, for they do not know Mordechai’s lineage. And yet this is their wisest advice, and not Zeresh’s suggestion to build a gallows for Mordechai (5:14), which The Targum identifies as a most complex and detailed proposal:

“You can’t kill Mordechai with a sword, for [Moshe] already survived Paroh’s executioner. And King Menashe once survived a fatal snakebite. And stoning won’t work, for that’s how Dovid killed Golias. And Daniel survived the lion’s pit, and Chananya Misha’el and Azaria all survived the furnace. And you can’t exile Mordecahi to the desert, since the Bnei Yisrael thrived there en route to Eretz Yisrael. And Yoseif survived jail. And Yitzchak survived the knife [at the Akeidah]. What else can we do but hang him... Tomorrow, inform the King that Mordechai refuses to bow down to you, as Achashveirosh himself commanded (see 3:2), and therefore Mordechai is deserving of death for disobeying the King’s orders.”

Targum, Megilas Esther 5:14

Zeresh shows a superior command of Jewish history, a firm grasp of the methods of execution, and even a working knowledge of politics. How could this not be categorized Chachmah?!

All things considered, Zeresh’s advise is so sharp and so well contrived, it’s hard to believe how badly it backfired! Why was Haman ultimately hanged and not Mordechai? Haman may have plotted behind the King’s back and even ‘fallen’ on top of the Queen, but he never directly violated the law of the land; Mordechai, on the other hand, blatantly subverted the King’s decree to bow to Haman!

The Malbim provides a satisfying explanation. Haman too defied a royal edict, and the Malbim appropriately draws the proof from Charvona’s quip (7:9), the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. All the while Haman was riding Mordechai around Shushan, proclaiming “So shall be done to the man in the King’s liking,” there was a gallows erected with Mordechai’s name on it. Everyone who would see the gallows would know Mordechai was slated for hanging later that afternoon, and Mordechai wouldn’t look so great in the populous’ eyes, contrary to Achashveriosh’s wishes. Therefore, Haman’s construction of the gallows undermined the very orders the King handed him, and so he too was guilty of subverting a royal decree.

One might expect Charvona’s mention of the tree to remind Achashverosh that even Mordechai was, in truth, deserving of death. But instead, it only reminded Achashveirosh of Haman’s upstart attitude, his tendency to act on a whim without first consulting the higher authorities.

“VaYomeir Memuchan.” (1:16) Rav Kehana says: From here we see that upstart underlings [since Haman’s nickname, Memuchan, came last in the list of Paroh’s advisors] impatiently jump to the head [for Memuchan was the first to offer advice].

Meseches Megilah, 12b

The gemara asks, “why was Haman nicknamed Memuchan?” and answers, “because he was Muchan LiPuraniyos, prepared for woe.” From Haman’s very outset, the Megilah paints him a sloppy, haphazard, and assuming officer, always eager to act without conferring or consulting. Just as he jumps to deal with Achashveirosh’s marital and political issues, he later builds the gallows and then goes to inform the King of Mordechai’s disobedience. It is his presumptuous and arrogant tendencies that ultimately do him in, and it was Zeresh’s proposal to first make the tree (overnight) and then go inform the King (in the morning) so that he could arrive at Esther’s party at mental ease, instead of troubling himself to construct Mordechai’s gallows. Amazingly, the fatal flaw in Zeresh’s advice was her lack of uncertainty.

The more and more we analyze the scenarios of the Megilah, the more and more apparent it becomes that Chachmah is dependant not on one’s breadth of knowledge, but rather upon one’s recognition of what he doesn’t know.

But we still haven’t addressed any of our most pertinent questions. We can pretend to identify Chukim as the source of Chachmah, for we follow Chukim despite not understanding their benefits, and we thereby come to recognition of what we don’t know. But why should such behavior earn us respect in the Goyim’s eyes? And if Mordechai did possess this level of Chachmah, for he ultimately earns the respect of all the nations, then why didn’t he gain Haman’s respect too?

Looking again at the subtleties within Charvona’s appeal, we find a peculiar description of Mordechai. He is, again according to the Malbim, Asher Dibeir Tov Al HaMelech, the one who speaks good regarding the King (as opposed to the GR”A’s understanding of these words, that they refer to Haman’s intent to speak good, to pass the idea across to the King that morning). In other words, the Malbim clarifies, Mordechai should be favored because of his success as the King’s guardian. A few years back, Mordechai saved Achashveirosh from assassination at the hands of Bigsan and Seresh. Therefore, Achashveirosh can interpret Moerdechai’s refusal to stand and bow to Haman as an expression of his concern for the King’s life. Mordechai’s job, his orders from the King, was to guard the palace, to be Yosheiv BiSha’ar HaMelech, and so he couldn’t be expected to fulfill both ends of contradictory orders. Moreso, Mordechai chose well to put the King’s life in higher priority than Haman’s Kavod. All in all Mordechai’s actions, from Achashveirosh’s perspective, retain a notable level of consistency, and for that Mordechai is not only spared, but respected.

Such respect would be hard to earn from Haman, for Haman knew exactly why Mordechai refused to bow. Ki Higid LaHem Asher Hu Yihudi, Mordechai refused for religious reasons, out of an unwillingness to bow to Haman’s idol. However, only one generation back, when Nevuchadnetzar unveiled an idol of his own, all the Jews bowed to it, and so Haman became very frustrated at not only the attitude of Mordechai, but also the inconsistent practices of the Jewish nation as a whole. As the pasuk (3:6) states, it was not enough for Haman to harm Mordechai, for the servants had informed Haman of Mordechai’s nationality, and so Haman sought to destroy Mordechai’s entire nation.

The students of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai once asked [their teacher], “Why did all the Jews deserve destruction?” He replied, “You tell me,” to which they proposed, “Because they attended Achashveirosh’s party?” Rabbi Shmon responded, “But then only the Jews in Shushan should have been slated for annihilation?” to which the Talmidim exclaimed, “so you tell us.” Rabbi Shimon answered, “Because they all bowed down to [Nevuchadnetzar’s] idol.”

Meseches Megilah, 12a

At the very root of Chachmah lies consistency. Mordechai’s persistence to sit at his post – even though he was led around town on the King’s horse, once the reward ended he returned to the gates – earned him the respect of the King. He himself was consistent in his actions, and so there was no opening to indict him. And within his persistence and consistency is the wherewithal to never impulsively react to another’s emotions.

It gives new meaning to the concept Marbeh BiYishiva Marbeh BiChachmah, especially considering Mordechai was Yosheiv BiSha’ar HaMelech.

In retrospect, this is the very midah of Chachmah that Shlomo HaMelech so professionally exhibits. Two mothers apprach with heartfelt pleas, yet Shlomo remains calm enough to use their own emotions against them, instead of letting his own emotions get the better of him.

True Chachmah, unlike the advice of Zeresh, is divorced from the emotions that complement one’s perception of the law. We can keep a Chok because we don’t ask ourselves whether it makes sense. When our emotions determine our system of laws, we become estranged from the Chukim, and we also become inconsistent and hypocritical as our emotions and reactions vary from day to day. The Chukim, therefore, are our Chachmah and Binah, the anchor that makes us appear straight, steadfast, and consistent, in the eyes of the Goyim.

In contrast, there are other times when it is proper not to sit, proper to take action. When Mordechai discovers Haman’s plans to destroy Klal Yisrael, he immediately instructs Esther to entreat the King on behalf of her people (4:8). When Esther hesitates, Mordechai lashes, “U’Mi Yodei’ah Im LaEis KaZos HiGa’at LiMalchus, who knows whether it was for an opportunity like this that you ascended to royalty.” Mordechai seems certain that the proper plan of action is for Esther to get up and approach the King, even though she will be risking her life, even though he is uncertain himself whether this is Esther’s destiny. How then does Mordechai choose when to sit idly by and when to get up and take proactive force?

There is a clear distinction to be made between the impulsive reactions of a fool and those of a Tzadik like Mordechai HaYihudi. When Mordechai reacts, he acts in accordance with what he believes the Ratzon of Hashem to be. It was Haman’s desire that Mordechai bow, but Hashem’s desire that Mordechai not bow, and so Mordechai easily chose not to bow. But when Esther was sent to speak to the King, Mordechai was acting in hopes of fulfilling Hashem’s Ratzon, in hopes of preserving his nation’s existence and eradicating Amaleik from existence. Therefore, it was proper to react, for his reaction was not in accordance with another person’s desires, but rather in accordance with the Torah he fought so stalwartly to maintain.

And so when we keep our Torah, when we observe the Chukim as steadfastly as we legislate the Mishpatim, we establish a closer connection to HaKadosh Baruch Hu, thus furthering our spiritual growth, and bringing ourselves closer to our ultimate Geula. Even the Goyim recognize this incredible potential

Achashveirsoh sent for the sages of the Umos HaOlam, and they all came to him. He said to them: Should I eradicate this nation [the Jews] from the world? They immediately responded: How could you do so?!... [A]ll the other nations of the world are called Nochrim, foreigners, in front of Hashem, but Yisrael are called Krovim, relatives, as the pasuk (Tehilim 148:14) says “LiBnei Yisrael Am K’rovo…”

…[A]nd not only that, but no nation is closer to Hashem than Yisrael, as the pasuk (Devarim 4:7) says “Ki Mi Goi Gadol Asher Lo Elohim Kerovim Ailav KaHashem Elokeinu BiChol Kori’einu Ailav,” what other nation has a G-d as close to them as Hashem is to us when we call out to Him.”

Midrash Esther Rabbah, 7:13

Karov Hashem LiChol Kori’av LiChol Asher Yikrau’hu BiEmes

Tehilim, 145:18