Parashat BaMidbar

And Hashem spoke to Moshe saying: And I have taken the Levi’im from amongst the Bnei Yisrael in every Jewish firstborn’s stead, and the Levi’im will work for Me. For every firstborn belongs to Me; from the day that I smote every firstborn in Mitzrayim, I separated every Jewish firstborn – from man to animal – to be for Me, I am Hashem.

BaMidbar, 3:11-13

Rashi explains that Hashem did not originally appoint the Levi’im to serve Him; rather, the Bechorim lost their privilege when they served the Eigel HaZahav. As we know, any Kohein who serves Avoda Zara is indefinitely invalidated from performing Hashem’s Avoda, and so the Halacha was no different for these Bechorim. Therefore, when Hashem chooses the Levi’im for His Avoda in these three pasukim, His choice is not reiterating obvious and known facts.

However, Rashi’s explanation blatantly contrasts the very words of our pasukim! Somehow, the selection of the Levi’im is directly connected to Makas Bechoros. Somehow, the replacement of the Bechorim relates significantly to the plague they survived the previous year. How then can Rashi come along and link our pasukim’s basis to Cheit Ha’Eigel, as sensible or sound as his explanation appears?

On second thought, it’s difficult to imagine that our pasukim come to teach us about the selection of the Levi’im and the replacement of the bechorim, for the previous pasukim just described all the work that the Levi’im would do! Hakreiv Es Matei Levi, put Sheivet Lev in charge of the Mishkan. Do these commands belong before Sheivet Levi replaces the Bechorim, or after the Temurah? Clearly, it belongs after, so why in the world should it precede Hinei Lakachti Es HaLivi’im?!

But before we can explain the reversal of these two parashiot, and before we can explain the correlation between the Pidyon Bechorim and Makas Bechoros, we must first speculate as to whether the service to Hashem here is a form of Srara, officiation, or of Avdus, indignation. Is this service a privilege or a burden?

When we look back at the aftermath of Makas Bechoros, the Kli Yakar muses, we see that each firstborn is forced to pay a Pidyon to Hashem in return for having been preserved; such action suggests that the result of their salvation from Mitzrayim, the position they entered into, was one of Avdus to Hashem. But it is hard to believe that the Levi’im’s good behavior at Cheit HaEigel would prompt their replacement of the Bechorim as Hashem’s slaves; clearly, the Levi’im are entering in to a privileged position of officiation.

Clearly, the Kli Yakar continues, Avodas Hashem is a privilege and not a burden. Furthermore, it is a mistake to think that the Bechorim were forced into this Avoda because Hashem spared them during Makas Bechoros, for they were selected for service from a much earlier time (see the Ibn Ezra). Therefore, we must explain the effects of being saved from Makas Bechoros exclusively as the need for Pidyon.

The Kli Yakar leaves us with a conclusive outlook of these three pasukim. The fact that the Bechorim were selected for Avoda has nothing to do with Makas Bechoris, nor does the selection of the Levi’im. The Bechorim were disqualified at Cheit HaEigel, along with eleven other Shvatim, and the Levi’im were thus selected MiToch Bnei Yisrael, by default. But as a disqualified officer of G-d, each Bechor would have a strong argument not to pay the (potential) additional five shekel fine to each Levi; he’s already been punished, what right does Hashem have to punish him more? To that Hashem responds, “Ki Li Kol Bechor, every Bechor is doubly guilty in My eyes, for I spared them the first time they deserved to die, and yet they still sinned against me!”

Looking back at pasuk 12, we see that Hashem’s remark “Lakachti Es HaLevi’im” is not meant as an exaltation of the Sheivet, but rather as a jab at the Bechorim; the full context reads “Lakachti Es HaLevi’im… Tachas Kol Bechor.” In this initial pasuk, we detail the replacement of the Bechorim, and in the next pasuk, we justify their payment, Ki Li Kol Bechor. All in all, we see that there was never any consideration of placing these pasukim before Hakreiv Es Matei Levi, for the Bechorim would have nobody to pay had the Levi’im not been inaugurated.

Likewise, the census Moshe conducts is broken into two phases; first the Levi’im are counted, and then the Bechorim. Naturally, one would expect the Bechorim to first be accounted for – then each Levi can arrive as his respective Bechor’s replacement. But the census, in reality, was not the process of replacement, but rather an effect; only after the Bechorim are replaced do they require this redemption – either through a human swap of sorts, or through a payment to Aharon HaKohein and his sons.

Within this concept of redemption, as opposed to replacement, comes the insertion of interpersonal emotions not normally associated to consequence and punishement. However, when one considers the nature of said consequences, the reversal of the attendant and the outsider, and the attendants’ actual need to act as the Zar’s messenger to HaKadosh Baruch Hu, then it becomes clear why such a payment is necessary. The very fact that the Bechorim could sin against Hashem in spite of their immunity from Makas Bechoros indicates a blatant disregard of Hakaras HaTov. While the rest of Klal Yisrael could accept the Kehuna’s upheaval with ease, the Bechorim would struggle to accredit the proper regard to those positioned above them – regardless of petty grudges. Therefore, each one was forced to pay his fellow Levi, to express a true feeling of connection to his representative Korban-bringer. And only then, with this unified HaKaras HaTov for the Levi’im’s Avoda, could the Mishkan be established.

Parashat Emor

At the center of Parshat Emor lies the complete list of Yamim Tovim, Asher Tikra’u Mikra’ei Kodesh. Pesach, Shavuos, Rosh HaShana,Yom Kipper, and lastly Succos. The details enumerated are rather predictable; we mention the general Issurei Melacha, the collection of Korbanos, and the various Halachos belonging to each respective Mo’eid. The central theme seems pretty much obvious, and all these Inyanim presumably belong within the parasha; yet Rashi’s comments suggest just the opposite:

“And you shall offer a fire to Hashem for [Pesach’s] seven days. The seventh day [of Pesach] will be holy, and you shall not do any work.”
VaYikra, 23:8

ViHikravtem Isheh LaHashem, these are the Korbanei Musaf which are stated in Parashat Pinchas [as well]. And why are they mentioned here? To tell you that one Korban Mussaf does not affect the others [meaning, if one fails to bring one day’s Korban Mussaf, he nonetheless retains his obligation to bring the next day’s Mussaf].
Rashi, VaYikra 23:8

The Sifra, as quoted by Rashi, makes a seemingly unsubstantiated assumption. The Midrash identifies the mention of the Korbanos Musaf in our parasha as an indication that the Korbanos do not function as a complete set but rather as individual obligations, but there is no such indication from the pasuk. Maybe we could have learned from our pasuk that the Musafin are Mi’akeiv each other! The drasha is totally arbitrary!

Perhaps even more problematic is the fact that the drasha is based on the very assumption that our pasuk is out of place. The Midrash asserts that the topic of Korban Mussaf has no place in our parasha, but the Mussaf is by no means the only Korban in our parasha. We elaborate on the Omer, and detail the entire process of the Shtei HaLechem. When all the Korbanos of all the Moad’im are mentioned, how can we point to one particular Korban – or in this case, the majority of the Korbanos – and call it out of place!?

Interestingly, the distinction one can draw between the Omer/Shtei HaLechem offerings and the Mussaf Korbanos – namely the respective presence or absence of grain (or bread) – is a theme that continuously appears across the various topics covered by this parasha. We discuss which Kohanim cannot offer Korbanos – either due to physical defect or improper action – and which ones can eat from Kodesh, and which animals can be offered as Kodesh, and every time we refer to the Korbanos, we term them Lechem.

Rashi explains that we are not referring to literal bread, for there is no bread ever placed onto the Mizbeiach; rather, Lechem refers to any meal. The pasuk in Daniel says that Ba’alshatzar made a great feast, and the term used for “feast” is L’Cheim, so we see that any Seudah can be called Lechem. Therefore, when the pasuk says Lo Yikrav LiHakriv Lechem Elokav, this means that the blemished Kohein cannot offer any Korbanos to Hashem.

It is therefore relatively safe to assume that the on-topic Korbanos in our parahsa are those that involve bread, like the Shtei HaLechem and Omer, which are discussed in elobarate detail, and that the Mussafin are out of place because they lack this correlation to bread. However, if Rashi identifies any Korban – including a Korban Mussaf – to be a Lechem Elokav, how can we understand the Mussafin to be out of place and off-topic?

How can we understand that concept of a Korban being termed Lechem in the first place? One would speculate that a Korban resembles bread in the sense that both are meals, just as Rashi says. This means that placing a Korban on the Mizbei’ach is like serving a meal to HaKadosh Baruch Hu. However, if such was the meaning of the term Lechem, one would expect the section of Korbanos to begin with the most meal-like of all Korbanos, the Tamid, which is offered twice daily – once in the morning and once in the evening. And yet, there is not a single mention of the Korban Tamid in our entire parsha (not even by the Menorah later in the parasha, whose lighting is described relative to the Korban Tamid in Parashat BiHa’alosecha, but not in our parasha)!

Perhaps to gain a clearer understanding of how a Korban resembles a meal we should look to the Gemara in Berachos:

Rabbi Chanina Bar Papa said, “Anyone who derives benefit from this world without [first] saying a Brachah, it is as if he has stolen from HaKadosh Baruch Hu.”
Mesechet Berachos, 35b

The Ritva explains that man’s purpose in this world is to perform Avoda for Hashem. Avoda can manifest itself in many forms, and it is by no means limited to Hekdesh objects. For instance, the Avoda man performs with his food is the Brachah he makes on it, the recognition he expresses that everything in this world belongs to Hashem.

Rashi comments on Rabbi Chanina Bar Papa’s statement that it is actually not the food that is stolen from Hashem when one forgoes its Brachah, but rather the Brachah itself, Hashem is deprived of the very Avoda we were created to give Him. We see from Rashi’s remark that the food Hashem provides us with is not ideally to be offered back to Hashem, but rather used as the mere mechanism by which we thank Hashem for providing us with benefit. The Avoda we perform is not the offering of our food, but rather the eating of it, provided that we recognize HaKadosh Baruch Hu as the source of all our benefit.

Therefore, when Rashi equates a Korban to Lechem, he is by no means suggesting that we place a meal in front of Hashem, but rather that we place the meal in front of ourselves, that we ideally perform the Avoda of thanking Hashem for our food by turning it into a Korban. Appropriately enough, the first Korban listed in our parasha is the Korban Pesach, which we prepare and then partake of. We continue with the Korban Omer, which permits the consumption of Chadash, and then the Shtei HaLechem, which is accompanied by the Shtei K’Vasim, the only Korban Tzibur all year that can be eaten from – the rest are Olos, not Shlamim.

It therefore follows that the Mussafin listed in our parasha are indeed out of place, for they do not bear this resemblance to Lechem quite like the other Korbanos do. They are totally offered on the Mizbei’ach, totally burnt, like a meal placed in front of Hashem. Therefore we learn from their placement in our parasha that the Mussafin are not Mi’akeiv one another, that they cannot affect each other’s validity.

Had we considered the ideal Korban to be a meal placed in front of Hashem, an Olah, then we could have speculated that the Mussafin affect each other. Once we miss a single Korban, then the nature of Hashem’s meal has been drastically affected, we are placing an incomplete offering in front of him. But once we recognize that the ideal Korban is a meal placed in front of ourselves, simply the mechanism by which we offer recognition and thanks to our Creator, then what Hava Amina could we ever have that failure to offer a Korban Mussaf on Tuesday should affect the Korban Mussaf for Wednesday?! Our obligation to thank Hashem has in no way altered; we look for every opportunity to perform Hahsem’s Avoda on Wednesday, whether we missed an opportunity on Tuesday.

Along our parasha’s string of Korbanos, we come to recognize how every Avoda does not require the surrendering of our property to Hashem, but the opposite. We do not consecrate our possessions, but rather consecrate our actions, thus furthering our relationship with the Ribono Shel Olam. Through the Lechem we partake in, we come not to be only Mikadesh the bread itself, but also Mikadeish Hashem’s name.

Kidoshim Yihiyu LeiLokeihem ViLo YiChallilu Sheim Elokeihem Ki Es Ishei Hashem Lechem Elokeihem Heim Makrivim ViHayu Kodesh
VaYikra, 21:6